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Abstract: I review and amplify on some of the many uses of representing a
scientific theory in a particular context as a collection of models endowed with a
similarity structure, which encodes the ways in which those models are similar
to one another. This structure, which is related to topological structure, proves
fruitful in the analysis of a variety of issues central to the philosophy of science.
These include intertheoretic reduction, emergent properties, the epistemic con-
nections between modeling and inference, the semantics of counterfactual con-
ditionals, and laws of nature. The morals are twofold: first, the further adoption
of formal methods for describing similarity (and related topological) structure
has the potential to aid in decisive progress in philosophy of science; and second,
the selection and justification of such structure is not a matter of technical con-
venience, but rather often involves great conceptual and philosophical subtlety.
I conclude with various directions for future research.
1 Introduction
Most work on the role of similarity in philosophy of science has focused on
analogical (i.e., similarity-based) reasoning (Hesse, 1966; Bartha, 2016) and on
scientific representation, i.e., whether and how models are similar to the tar-
gets they represent (Giere, 1988; Weisberg, 2013; Frigg and Nguyen, 2016). Yet,
many topics in philosophy of science concern or depend on the relationships
between scientific models themselves—models that are sometimes freestanding,
but often associated with a particular theory or theories—along various aspects:
How are they similar? How do they differ? In what ways are they the same?
These questions concern not just philosophers of science, but practicing scien-
tists, too (Frigg and Hartmann, 2012). While scientists and philosophers have
usually developed ad hoc, often informal methods for answering these questions
in specific contexts, there is some benefit to pursuing a more unified, system-
atic approach. Besides the pragmatic aid it could provide in orienting possible
answers to analogous questions in new domains, it would also reveal the com-
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mon types and degrees of structure that these questions probe. In doing so, it
might also suggest new solutions to old philosophical problems and even novel
questions that the potpourri obscured.
My main purpose here is to outline a research program that does just this,
using tools adapted from topology.1 While often conceived of as the mathematical
study of the properties of spaces preserved under continuous deformation, such
as stretching and bending (but not tearing or gluing), topology has in fact a much
greater domain of application. Here, the basic insight is an analogy between
various sorts of similarity and geometric proximity. If one represents a theory
by its models, then the resulting space of models represents the collection of
possibilities or states of affairs that the theory affords.2 In other words, instead of
each element representing a point in (a hypothetical) physical space, it represents
a way a part of the world could be, according to the theory in question. A
similarity structure on this space encodes a particular sort of similarity amongst
these models. Just as the topology of a geometrical space determines which
curves in that space vary continuously, a similarity structure on the models of a
theory determines which families of models represent continuously varying sets
of possibilities. And just as the topology of a geometrical space determines which
sequences of points converge to another, so too does a similarity structure on
the models of a theory determine which sequences of states of affairs eventually
become arbitrarily similar to another.
Equipping the space of models with extra structure is necessary for this
task because the bare space itself does not provide the expressive resources
for these kinds of statements. However, I do not hold that a theory should be
1 I am not the first to suggest adding some sort of topological structure to the models of a
scientific theory: one finds it—in particular, the invocation of uniform structure (Willard,
1970, Ch. 9)—in the German structuralist school (Schmidt, 2014), although that approach
has tended to assign a single structure to a theory; see Balzer et al. (1987, Ch. 7) and
Ludwig and Thurler (2006, Ch. 4.6). (One does find the suggestion of using topology, not
uniform structure, in Scheibe (2001, p. 318–9), but this suggestion does not seem to have
been pursued systematically.) By contrast, as I discuss later in this section, I take such
sorts of structure to accrue only to particular contexts of investigation for a theory; in
different contexts, different similarity structure may be determined. See also Mormann
(2013) for more general reflections on the history and relations between topology and
philosophy of science.
2 I do not assume that a theory merely is a collection of models—see the discussion at
the beginning of section 2. Also, I do not take this representation to imply any substantive
commitment beyond what is required for the typical uses of a scientific theory common
to plausible versions of scientific realism and antirealism. The topological approach to the
formalization and application of similarity is intended to be a broad tent.
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represented simpliciter by a structured space—that is, its set of possibilities
endowed with a similarity structure. After all, it seems reasonable to expect
the relevant notion of similarity to be contextual, determined by the details of
a particular investigation, which would in general preclude associating a single
similarity structure with the possibilities a theory affords.3 Nevertheless, if one
can adequately formulate, in a particular context, how a theory’s models are to
be regarded as relevantly similar, then one can use the structure thereby induced
to answer longstanding questions regarding a surprising variety of topics.
In addition to offering a formal, fine-grained representation of similarity
concepts, one can also use the framework to discover what our commitments
about relevant similarity entail, which could well be surprising and would count
as a discovery in the colloquial sense. For instance, in section 5.2, I indicate how
according to one way of describing how relativistic spacetimes are similar, every
one is arbitrarily similar to one with time travel. There is also an indirect way in
which the framework facilitates a process of discovering new similarities, namely
through a kind of reflective equilibrium. If one is unsure what the relevant sim-
ilarities are supposed to be in a certain context, then one can test an answer
by seeing what results it entails, then modifying the answer in response if nec-
essary. Through the interplay of describing similarities precisely and the results
this entails, one may indeed discover ways in which the models are relevantly
similar that one did not before consider.
So, after section 2 introduces the formalism of similarity structures and their
relations to various topological structures, the following four sections will dis-
cuss a selection from this variety.4 Section 3 concerns approximative, or limiting-
type reduction between different scientific theories concerned with overlapping
domains. There, similarity structure on the joint collection of models of both
theories helps one explicate the circumstances under which the models of one
approximate, or are sufficiently similar to, the other, thereby lending to the
explanation of the (typically older, less accurate) one in terms of the other.
The natural conceptual counterpart to reduction is emergence, and the topic of
section 4 is the emergence of properties, in particular those that arise in some
models with respect to others, such as for models that are (in a precise sense) the
limit of a sequence of other models. An essential aspect of emergent properties
is their comparative novelty or inexplicability, and this section exhibits how this
can be defined in terms of dissimilarity. Moving broadly from primarily represen-
3 One can provide more formal arguments to this effect in particular cases. See, e.g.,
Fletcher (2016) for the case of topological similarity structures for general relativity.
4 Many of these topics are adumbrated in Fletcher (2014, Ch. 5).
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tational topics to inferential ones, section 5 focuses on the problem of justified
inference from models. When a model of a state of affairs is idealized—a situation
that almost always obtains—it contains deliberate distortions or simplifications
in its representation thereof.5 Which properties of a model is one justifying in
inferring about its target? I formulate and discuss a necessary condition for such
an inference, inspired by Duhem (1954), which requires the inferred property to
hold of all sufficiently similar models under consideration. These kinds of con-
ditions have long been closely related to issues involving modality and modal
reasoning, so section 6 outlines how similarity structure on a collection of models
suffices to provide an ordering semantics for counterfactual conditionals (Lewis,
1981; Kratzer, 1981; Swanson, 2011), with the models as stand-ins for possible
worlds. This suggests an interesting new approach to laws of nature that shares
affinities with both antirealist and systems accounts thereof, perhaps without
some of their shortcomings. Finally, in the concluding section 7, I review some
broad advantages to the program, a few shortcomings, and a swath of interest-
ing questions arising from each of the above topics that have yet to be fulled
explored.
2 Similarity and Topology
2.1 Theories and Models
What does it mean to represent a theory by its models? I have in mind, for
example: representing (pure) General Relativity by the class of Lorentzian ge-
ometries (M, gab),6 where M is the manifold of spacetime events and gab the
metric tensor; representing the simple theory of predator-prey interactions in
ecology by solutions (x(t), y(t)) to the Lotka-Volterra equations (Sarkar, 2016,
§2.1),
dx
dt
= αx− βxy, dy
dt
= δxy − γy,
which denote the population of predators x and prey y over time t; or repre-
senting the preferences of an agent by a partial order  over states of the world
5 These are, strictly speaking, only one type of idealization—Galilean idealization (Mc-
Mullin, 1985). For more on the categorization of types of idealization, see, e.g., Frigg and
Hartmann (2012) and Weisberg (2013, Ch. 6).
6 Strictly speaking, the class of smooth, connected, four-dimensional Lorentzian
manifolds—see Hawking and Ellis (1973, Ch. 3.1) or Malament (2012, p. 119).
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A.7 Thus, I have in mind the notion of model as used by applied mathemati-
cians, rather than logicians, where the model represents a possible state of affairs
falling under the domain of the theory.
There are several advantages to this approach to representing theories, in-
cluding eschewing the complications of providing axiomatizations for them—
a form in which real scientific theories are not often provided—and guarding
against unintended models. But I want to stress that I do not demand that one
identify a theory as a class of models, only that one can represent it as such
(Thompson, 2007, p. 485–6). In doing so, one may well distort a multifaceted
theory that has nonformal aspects (Bailer-Jones, 2002; Craver, 2002).8 Accord-
ingly, I do not intend here to engage with the debate concerning the what the
“right” structure for scientific theories is supposed to be—even active defenders
of the syntactic view of theories take a concern with models to be consonant
with their approach, a shared commitment amongst virtually all approaches
(Winther, 2015; Halvorson, 2013, 2016), which is all that similarity structure
requires. (Cf. footnote 2.) But, I do confine attention to theories not suffering
so much from vagueness that their models can be described as a definite class
of objects—usually, mathematical ones. For example, “classical mechanics,” de-
spite being obviously a mathematical theory, is on its own too vague to specify
a definite class of models—there are many different varieties of classical me-
chanics (Wilson, 2006, 2009), differing even in whether they are deterministic
(Malament, 2008; Fletcher, 2012). Thus, to represent a theory of classical me-
chanics by its models, one must describe precisely which possible states of affairs
it allows. Moreover, in dynamical theories, such as theories of mechanics, these
states of affairs are not typically states at a time—indeed, in relativistic theories
there is no objective such state—but rather (perhaps partial) histories.
Now, whatever the nature of the states of affairs or phenomena described
by a theory, different ones can be similar to one another. For instance, the
history of a proton falling in a gravitational field from a certain location in a
relatively electrically neutral space will be similar in many respects to that of
a neutron falling from approximately the same location. These respects might
include the shape and spatial location of the trajectories, but not the type of
particle involved or the electromagnetic fields in the vicinity of the trajectories.
Generally, similarity can come in degrees and in myriad types, not all of which
7 A partial order  on a set A is a binary relation on A that is reflexive (∀a, a  a),
transitive (∀a, b, c, if a  b and b  c then a  c), and anti-symmetric (∀a, b, if a  b and
b  a then a = b).
8 Or that has more formal structure (e.g., category-theoretic) than is traced here (Halvor-
son, 2012, 2013, 2016; Halvorson and Tsementzis, 2017).
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Fig. 1. A representation of two “path” models, the left one linear (L) and the right one
with a fork (F ).
are relevant for a given context, because not all make a difference to the questions
investigated in that context. But if the context is unambiguous enough, one can
apply the relevant notion of similarity with the following formal structure.
2.2 Similarity Structure
Let us begin with defining qualitative, binary similarity relations:
Definition 1. A similarity relation ∼ on a set X is a non-empty binary relation
on X that is quasi-reflexive: for all x, y ∈ X if y ∼ x, then y ∼ y and x ∼ x.
The relation y ∼ x is interpreted as “y is similar to x”. Quasi-reflexivity requires
that if any element is similar to another, then both the former and the latter
are similar to themselves.
Now, similarity relations are commonly demanded (Carnap, 1967; Schreider,
1975; Mormann, 1996; Konikowska, 1997) to be not just quasi-reflexive, but
reflexive—x ∼ x for every x ∈ X—and symmetric: if y ∼ x then x ∼ y. While
many useful similarity relations do satisfy these conditions, there are also some
that do not. For example, consider a theory with many sorts of models, but
exactly two of which are distinct paths, both infinitely long, with the first linear
(L), and the second with a fork (F )—see Fig. 1. Say that one object, y, is
observationally similar to another, x, denoted y ∼O x, if they are both paths
and any observer having traveled a finite distance in x has had experiences
compatible with being in y.9 Then ∼O = {(L,L), (F,L), (F, F )}. Observational
similarity is only quasi-reflexive because it simply does not apply to non-paths,
and it is not symmetric because any observer having traveled any finite distance
9 This is a simplified analog of an independently interesting property described for rela-
tivistic spacetimes, (weak) observational indistinguishability (Malament, 1977; Manchak,
2009).
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in L could well be on a branch of F , but observers in F who encounter the fork
have experiences incompatible with being on L.
Of course, one could consider many other features in determining how these
models are similar. As first argued explicitly by Goodman (1972), similarity
judgments are contextual and often come in degrees or types.10 Thus, consid-
ering the ways in which models are similar to one another can determine more
than a single similarity relation.
Definition 2. A similarity space is an ordered pair (X,S), where X is a set and
S is a set of similarity relations on X, called a similarity structure.11
For such a similarity structure S containing ∼α, y ∼α x is interpreted as “y is
similar (in manner α) to x”.
Nor do we need to restrict ourselves to a fixed similarity structure for the
models of a theory, which should rather depend on a context of use: its similarity
relations should be all and only those that make a difference to the range of
investigative questions asked in that context. In the above example with paths,
for instance, the context determined that only those differences which made a
difference to the observations of any observer should be accounted for by the
similarity relations. But a different context could well determine some symmetric
or even reflexive similarity relations to be included in the relevant similarity
structure.
In any case, once a set of models X of a theory has been equipped with a
similarity structure S to form a similarity space (X,S), one can define many
interesting and useful relations from them.
Definition 3. The domain at x ∈ X of a similarity relation ∼ on X is the set
D(x) = {y ∈ X : y ∼ x}.12
10 Many of the formal models of similarity influenced by this analysis has focused on
cognitive judgments of similarity; see Decock and Douven (2011) for a review of and
references to this literature.
11 Here, my terminology for a similarity structure follows Konikowska (1997) rather than
Mormann (1996), who takes it to denote what I would call here a similarity space whose
similarity structure consists of just a single similarity relation, or Schreider (1975), who
does the same but calls them tolerance relations and tolerance spaces. Mathematically, a
similarity structure is very close to being a base for a semi-quasi-uniform space (Pu and
Pu, 1974), or what Császár (1974) calls a pseudo-uniform space.
12 These sets are called similarity neighborhoods in Mormann (1996) and tolerance
classes in Schreider (1975), although, as alluded above, these authors assume that a
similarity (tolerance) relation must be reflexive and symmetric.
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The domain of ∼ at x ∈ X is just the set of all the elements in X that are
similar to x.
In the following, let Bx denote the set of domains at x ∈ X of the similarity
relations in S and ℘X the power set of X.
Definition 4. The closeness operator clS : ℘X → ℘X of a similarity structure
(X,S) is defined by clS(A) = {x ∈ X : ∀D(x) ∈ Bx, D(x) ∩A 6= ∅}.
The value of the closeness operator acting on a set A ⊆ X is the collection of all
models arbitrarily similar to any model in A, i.e., those similar to the models of
the latter in all respects determined to be relevant by S.
The closeness operator also has some important properties. First, note that
it allows one to define important substructures of a similarity space:
Definition 5. The common domain of a similarity space (X,S) is the set clS(X).
The common domain of a similarity space is just the elements of the space
the domain at which is non-empty for each relation in the space’s similarity
structure.
Proposition 1. The closeness operator clS of a similarity space (X,S) is a pre-
closure operator on its common domain,13 i.e., it satisfies the following condi-
tions:
1. clS(∅) = ∅,
2. A ⊆ clS(A) for every A ⊆ clS(X), and
3. clS(A ∪B) = clS(A) ∪ clS(B) for all A,B ⊆ clS(X).
The proof follows immediately from the relevant definitions. Clearly, if the in-
terpretation of the closeness operator is that it yields all the models arbitrarily
similar to the ones on which it acts, then it should indeed be the case that
no models are arbitrarily similar to the empty collection of models; the models
themselves are arbitrarily similar to themselves; and those that are arbitrarily
similar to a model in either A or B are just those that are arbitrarily similar to
a model in A or a model in B.
There is another important relation involving the concept of arbitrary sim-
ilarity that holds not between sets and sets, but between sequences and points.
13 See Čech (1966, §14), who calls them simply closure operators; in modern usage
that name is reserved for preclosure operators for which cl(cl(A)) = cl(A). The closeness
operator of a topological similarity space (definition 14) satisfies this additional condition,
which, together with the three in the proposition, are known as the Kuratowski closure
axioms (Willard, 1970, p. 26).
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Definition 6. A sequence {xn}n∈N of models of X converges to x ∈ X (with
respect to S), written xn → x, when for every D(x) ∈ Bx, there is some N ∈ N
such that xn ∈ D(x) if n ≥ N .
In other words, a sequence of models converges to another when the former
eventually become arbitrarily similar to the latter, i.e., the sequence is eventually
contained in every D(x) ∈ Bx.
In similarity spaces, convergence implies closeness, but not vice versa.
Proposition 2. Let (X,S) be a similarity space and x, xn ∈ X for each n ∈ N.
If xn →S x, then x ∈ clS({xn}). The reverse implication does not hold.
Proof. The first part follows immediately from the definitions. For the sec-
ond part, let X = RR, the space of all real-valued functions of a single real
variable. Further, for each f ∈ X, define Dx1,...,xn1,...,n (f) = {g ∈ X : ∀k ∈
{1, . . . , n}, |g(xk) − f(xk)| < k} for any {x1, . . . , xn}, {1, . . . , n} ∈ Rn, and
let Bf = {Dx1,...,xn1,...,n (f) : n ∈ N}. If E is the set of f ∈ X such that f(x) = 0 or
1 and f(x) = 0 only finitely often while g(x) = 0, then one can show (Willard,
1970, p. 71–2) that g ∈ clS(E), yet no sequence in E converges to g.
This result is important because it shows that, in general, the models arbitrarily
similar to some collection of models are not necessarily those to which sequences
from the latter converge.
Now consider another similarity space (X ′,S ′), letting B′x′ denote the set of
domains at x′ ∈ X ′ of the similarity relations in S ′.
Definition 7. A function f : X → X ′ is continuous (with respect to S and S ′)
at x ∈ X when for every D′(f(x)) ∈ B′f(x), there is some D(x) ∈ B(x) such that
f [D(x)] ⊆ D′(f(x)). It is continuous (simpliciter) when it is continuous at each
x ∈ X.
In other words, a function is continuous when similar elements in the function’s
range contain the image of sufficiently similar elements in the function’s domain.
The continuous maps are the morphisms for similarity spaces, as the next
proposition attests.
Proposition 3. If (X,SX), (Y,SY ), and (Z,SZ) are similarity spaces and f :
X → Y and g : Y → Z are continuous, then g ◦ f : X → Z is continuous.
Proof. Analogous to the case of topological spaces, cf. Willard (1970, p. 45).
Thus the similarity isomorphisms are just the bicontinuous functions.
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2.3 Similarity and Topology
While one can investigate many features of theories by representing them in
particular contexts with similarity spaces as given in the aforementioned defi-
nitions, a link with more well-established mathematical tools can be forged if
these similarity spaces satisfy some very basic conditions.
Definition 8. A similarity space (X,S) is neighborly when it satisfies the follow-
ing conditions:
1. for every x ∈ X, there is some ∼ ∈ S such that x ∼ x; and
2. for every ∼α,∼β ∈ S, there is some ∼γ ∈ S such that y ∼γ x if and only if
y ∼α x and y ∼β x.
The first condition guarantees that the structure S covers X, in the sense that
there is some similarity relation which, for each x ∈ X, takes x to be similar
to itself. The second condition can be understood in terms of the concept of
a restriction. Formally, a restriction of a certain relation is just a relation that
is a subset of that certain relation. So, a restriction of a similarity relation is
one which is at least as strong or demanding as the latter. In these terms, the
second condition requires that the family contain all the restrictions formed by
finite intersections of its members: ∼γ = ∼α ∩ ∼β . I.e., if it contains a relation
of similarity in manner α, and one in manner β, then it contains a relation of
similarity in manner α and β. Of these two, only the first involves any substantive
constraint on the family of similarity relations, and a weak one at that, for the
second can be satisfied merely by closing the set of similarity relations under
finite intersections.
The domains of the similarity relations of a neighborly similarity space gen-
erate a canonical base for a neighborhood system, making that set into a pre-
topological space:14
Proposition 4. The set of domains Bx for each x ∈ X of a neighborly similarity
space is a neighborhood base at x, i.e.,
1. if D(x) ∈ Bx, then x ∈ D(x); and
2. if Dα(x), Dβ(x) ∈ Bx, then there is some Dγ(x) ⊆ Dα(x) ∩Dβ(x).
Definition 9. A neighborhood system at some x ∈ X is a neighborhood base Bx
for such that for any U ∈ Bx, if U ⊆ V ⊆ X then V ∈ Bx.
14 See Čech (1966, Ch. III.14.B) for an exposition of pretopological spaces, called there
closure spaces because a closure operator is taken as primitive (but is nonetheless defini-
tionally equivalent to the neighborhood definition given here). Also, I omit the proofs of
propositions 4 and 5, which follow immediately from the invoked definitions.
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Definition 10. A pretopology on a set X is a set T ⊆ X × ℘X consisting of a
neighborhood system for each x ∈ X.
Proposition 5. If (X,S) is a neighborly similarity space, then the set⊔x∈X{U ⊆
X : ∃D(x) ∈ S : D(x) ⊆ U} is a pretopology on X.
The induced pretopology on a set (of models of a theory, say,) with a neigh-
borly similarity space is that given in proposition 5, and a set equipped with a
pretopology is called a pretopological space.
The definitions of several important concepts of pretopological spaces mirror
those derived from similarity spaces. In the following, let a set X be equipped
with a pretopology T of neighborhood systems Bx.
Definition 11. The closure operator clT : ℘X → ℘X for the pretopological
space (X, T ) is defined by clT (A) = {x ∈ X : ∀U ∈ Bx, U ∩A 6= ∅}.
Definition 12. A sequence {xn}n∈N in X converges to x ∈ X (with respect to
T ), denoted xn →T x, when for every U ∈ Bx, there is some N ∈ N such that
xn ∈ U if n ≥ N .
Further, suppose that the pretopological space (X ′, T ′) has neighborhood sys-
tems B′x.
Definition 13. A function f : X → X ′ is continuous (with respect to T and
T ′) at x ∈ X when for every U ′ ∈ B′f(x), there is some U ∈ B(x) such that
f [U ] ⊆ U ′. It is continuous (simpliciter) when it is continuous at each x ∈ X.
As the astute reader will note, the definitions for these concepts in pretopologi-
cal spaces are essentially the same as for their counterparts for similarity spaces;
this justifies the notational equivocation between closeness and closure opera-
tors, and convergence (limits) and continuity in the two cases. The following
proposition captures this equivalence between these similarity and pretopologi-
cal concepts in the case of induced pretopologies.
Proposition 6. Let (X,S) and (X ′,S ′) be neighborly similarity spaces with in-
duced pretopologies T and T ′, respectively. Then:
1. For any A ⊆ X, clS(A) = clT (A).
2. For any sequence {xn}n∈N of X, xn →S x if and only if xn →T x.
3. A function f : X → X ′ is continuous with respect to S and S ′ if and only
if it is continuous with respect to T and T ′.
Thus one can prove many statements about the similarity structure on a set by
proving analogous statements about its canonical pretopology.
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Many similarity structures naturally arising in the context of scientific the-
ories satisfy a further condition:
Definition 14. A neighborly similarity space (X,S) is topological when, for every
∼α ∈ S, there is some ∼β ∈ S such that if y ∼β x and z ∼β y, then z ∼α x.
Being topological guarantees that for each similarity relation in the set, there is
another at least as strong as it, which in particular contains the latter’s tran-
sitive closure.15 This condition thus formalizes the idea that for each similarity
relation, one can always find another that is more restrictive—indeed, “twice”
as much—having in particular all its domains contained in the domain of the
first. It is the qualitative version of a sort of “/2” principle, according to which,
for each similarity relation, there is another whose domains are “half” as large.
Just as the similarity structure of a neighborly similarity space induces a
pretopology, a that of a topological similarity space induces a topology.
Definition 15. A neighborhood base Bx is topological when, for anyDα(x) ∈ Bx,
there is some Dβ(x) ∈ Bx such that for all y ∈ Dβ(x), there is some Dγ(y) ∈ By
such that Dγ(y) ⊆ Dα(x).
Proposition 7. The set of domains Bx for each x ∈ X of a topological similarity
space (X,S) is a topological neighborhood base at x, i.e.,
1. if D(x) ∈ Bx, then x ∈ D(x);
2. if Dα(x), Dβ(x) ∈ Bx, then there is some Dγ(x) ⊆ Dα(x) ∩Dβ(x); and
3. if Dα(x) ∈ Bx, then there is some Dβ(x) ∈ Bx such that for all y ∈ Dβ(x),
there is some Dγ(y) ∈ By such that Dγ(y) ⊆ Dα(x).
Proof. The first two conditions follow immediately from the first two conditions
for a neighborly set of similarity relations. For the third condition, pick any
Dα(x) ∈ Bx, and note that the third condition for a basically neighborly set of
similarity relations guarantees that there is some ∼β ∈ S such that if y ∼β x and
z ∼β y, then z ∼α x. By logical exportation, for any y ∈ Dβ(x), if z ∈ Dβ(y)
then z ∈ Dα(x). So the conclusion follows by letting γ = β.
One can then define the induced topology on a set with a topological similarity
structure in analogy with proposition 5. It is more traditional now, though,
to understand a topology in terms of open sets rather than neighborhoods.
According to this conception, a topology on X consists of a set of sets of X, its
15 Hence the other must be a restriction of the first, but this need not be strict, e.g., if
∼α is already transitive.
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open sets, that contains ∅ and X and is closed under arbitrary unions and finite
intersections; see, e.g., Willard (1970) or Steen and Seebach (1978).
Proposition 8. For any similarity structure on X whose domains form topologi-
cal neighborhood bases Bx for each x ∈ X, {U ⊆ X : ∀x ∈ U,∃D ∈ Bx : D ⊆ U}
is a topology on X.
Proof. See, e.g., Willard (1970, Theorem 4.5).
The induced topology on a set with a topological similarity structure is that given
in proposition 8.16
As the definitions (in terms of neighborhoods) of closure, convergence, and
continuity are the same for topological spaces as they are for pretopological
spaces, they cohere also cohere with those given by the similarity relations:
Proposition 9. Let (X,S) and (X ′,S ′) be topological similarity spaces with in-
duced topologies T and T ′, respectively. Then:
1. For any A ⊆ X, clS(A) = clT (A).
2. For any sequence {xn}n∈N of X, xn →S x if and only if xn →T x.
3. A function f : X → X ′ is continuous with respect to S and S ′ if and only
if it is continuous with respect to T and T ′.
Thus, just as before, one can prove many statements about the similarity struc-
ture on a set by proving analogous statements about its induced topology.
One could continue to consider further conditions that a family of similarity
relations might satisfy, but for current purposes the above will suffice. In focusing
on similarity spaces and their induced (pre)topologies, therefore, I do not mean
to suggest that these must capture the exact level of structure so as to be the
“right” tools to analyze similarity relations amongst models of a theory. But, in
the mathematized sciences, topological structure is natural and ubiquitous and
one must start somewhere. Furthermore, the following applications will reveal
how fruitful even this structure can be for analyzing some traditional questions
in the philosophy of science.
16 A topological family of similarity relations also exactly satisfies the axioms for the
base of a quasiuniformity on X (Steen and Seebach, 1978, p. 9, 37–38). Compared with
the definition given by Steen and Seebach, I have reversed the role of the first and second
places in the relation, but nothing substantial turns on this.
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3 Intertheoretic Reduction
3.1 The Idea of Reduction
In order for our space agencies to send rockets with people and instruments into
orbit, and complicated, delicate, and expensive space probes to other planets and
the distant reaches of our solar system, they must calculate and predict with
great accuracy these objects’ trajectories through space. Yet in this task, they
do not typically use Einstein’s theory of general relativity, our currently best
theory of space, time, and gravitation. They use instead the older and simpler
Newtonian theory, and to great effect, despite the quite different structure for
space-time which, on a realist construal, that theory ascribes to our world. Can
one explain the success of Newton’s theory in terms of Einstein’s, at least for
the ranges of phenomena for which it has been profitably applied?
The question of intertheoretic reduction between two theories, with which I
am concerned here, is just this sort of question. It demands an explanation for
the success of a theory, one we typically (but not necessarily) know to be empiri-
cally or explanatorily inadequate for some phenomena.17 Thus it is a type of syn-
chronic reduction, at least in the sense that it is a relation that holds between two
theories rather than being a process or activity—diachronic reduction—that sci-
entists or scientific communities undergo (van Riel and Van Gulick, 2016, §2.1).
As a matter of terminology, the philosophical literature describes this question
as concerning the reduction of Newton’s theory by Einstein’s (or, in other words,
whether Einstein’s theory reduces Newton’s), emphasizing the explanation of
the former by the latter, while the physics literature on the subject describes it
as concerning the reduction of Einstein’s theory to Newton’s, emphasizing the
circumstances under which the structure of the former is simplified to the latter.
In the end nothing of substance really turns on this difference, but I shall adopt
the philosophers’ terminology since my concern here is the explanation of the
success of Newton’s theory by Einstein’s.
Because this success is empirical, it will suffice to answer the explanatory
question by showing that, in the circumstances in which it is successfully ap-
plied, Newton’s theory gives predictions or empirical descriptions of phenomena
17 This is close to what Sklar (1967, p. 112) calls explaining away a theory, as how one
might attempt to use quantum mechanics to explain “why Newtonian mechanics seemed
to be correct; why it met with such apparent success for such a long period of time and
under such thorough experimental scrutiny.” However, I am here more concerned with
empirical adequacy rather than “correctness,” as such adequacy is not necessarily lost in
a certain domain of application even if it is lost in another.
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sufficiently similar to those of Einstein’s: the success of Newtonian theory is the
explanandum, its similarity (in those contexts of success) with general relativity
the explanans. By adapting the apparatus of the previous section, one can at-
tempt to capture this sort of similarity with the relevant similarity structure on
the joint class of models of both theories, making this joint class into a similarity
space. Of course, this apparatus would still be viable even if extra-empirical as-
pects of the theories were taken to be relevant for the explanatory question, or if
one focused on features to be hypothetically, but not actually, explained. In this
sense, it also provides a framework for understanding intertheoretic relationships
of the same form—ones that focus on relevant ways in which these theories are
similar or dissimilar, even if those ways do not concern actual empirical success
(Nickles, 1973; Wimsatt, 1976; Batterman, 2002).
In what follows, I first (in section 3.2) describe the general framework for
understanding intertheoretic reduction using similarity structure. Next, in sec-
tion 3.3, I apply this framework to the aforementioned case of the reduction
of Newton’s theory of gravitation by Einstein’s theory of general relativity, de-
scribing some partial results and open questions. Last, in section 3.4, I compare
this framework for reduction with three others, that of Nagel (1961) and its
descendants (Dizadji-Bahmani et al., 2010), the limit schema of Nickles (1973),
and that of the structuralists (Schmidt, 2014), respectively, showing how, in a
certain sense, it encompasses them.
3.2 Similarity Structures and Reduction
Consider a similarity space (X,S) with closeness operator cl. In particular, X
might be (or simply contain) the union of the models T and T ′ of two theories
describing the same—or at least overlapping—ranges of phenomena. Often, T
will be a newer, more empirically successful theory, while T ′ will be an older
theory with a more restricted domain of success. In this case, the collection of
similarity relations will be determined from all those properties of the models
which make a difference to an explanatory question, e.g., about the empirical
descriptions of phenomena that each model determines. Then the sorts of re-
ductive relationship that holds between T and T ′ can be classified using the
following terminology.
Definition 16. Let (X,S) be a similarity space with closeness operator cl. If
T, T ′ ⊆ X, then:
1. T completely reduces T ′ when T ′ ⊆ cl(T ).
2. T partially reduces T ′ when T ′ ∩ cl(T ) 6= ∅.
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3. T merely partially reduces T ′ when T partially but not completely reduces
T ′.
4. T fails to reduce T ′ when T does not partially reduce T ′.
If T completely reduces T ′, then the models of T ′ are arbitrarily similar to
models of T in the respects demanded by S. Thus, if S captures the similarity
of empirical descriptions needed to explain the success of T ′, then the complete
reduction of T ′ by T indicates that the potential success of each model of T ′—
each possible world or situation that the theory affords—can be explained in
terms of models of T .
To take a toy example, suppose that the only relevant prediction that theory
T ′ makes is that the value of a certain real parameter is 0. The theory T , on
the other hand, only has models in which this parameter is at least c/2 > 0,
but measurements of this common parameter at this time only have an accuracy
of ±c. Suppose that T is accepted for independent reasons, yet under certain
circumstances T ′ seems to be sufficiently empirically adequate. Then one can
model the relationship between the theories as follows. Consider a similarity
space ({0} ∪ (c/2,∞),Sc), where Sc consists of all the similarity relations ∼
whose domains are D(x) = {y ∈ R : |x− y| < } for  ≥ c. Any model x has a
smallest domain Dc(x), so in particular Dc(0) ∩ (c/2,∞) 6= ∅.18 It then follows
from the definition of the closeness operator that T ′ ⊆ cl(T ), i.e., T completely
reduces T ′. This shows that whenever the circumstances are such that T ′ is
successful in describing the parameter of interest, there is a model of T that
does so, too, because differences in values of the parameter of less than c are not
relevant, due to the postulated limited measurement precision.
If, on the other hand, some theory T merely partially reduces some theory
T ′, then some model of T ′ is not sufficiently similar to those of the newer, more
successful theory T . This may not ultimately spell the failure of the explanation
of the success of T ′, however. Let the domain of successful application of T ′
be the models S′ ⊆ T ′ that have found empirical success according to criteria
used to generate S (Ludwig and Thurler, 2006; Ehlers, 1986). (This set is not in
general determined by the theory itself or the similarity relations placed upon its
models, but rather by the interface of theory and experiment.) If T completely
reduces S′, the success of the older theory would be explained even though T
merely partially reduces T ′. In such cases, a merely partial reduction can be
evidence for delimiting the “physically reasonable” models of the older theory in
18 Similarity spaces with the sort of feature can be neighborly, but not topological, in
general: the “/2” principle, which being topological demands, prevents there from being
a relation in the space’s similarity structure with a smallest (non-trivial) domain.
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light of the newer theory, as proponents of quantum gravity sometimes do with
the quantum theory and general relativity (Sorkin, 1995).
If T merely partially reduces S′, however, then we have a case of Kuhn loss:
a successful model of the older theory which is not sufficiently similar to any
model of the newer theory (Kuhn, 1996; Post, 1971). Accordingly, the success
of the older theory would not be explained by the newer theory. Whether a
reductive relationship holds between the models of two theories therefore can
depend on the domain of application of the theory to be explained.
It also depends, of course, on the nature and specificity of the similarity
relations between them. If these relations describe differing degrees of similarity
in empirical descriptions, then they might well depend upon a contingent or
historically particular degree of measurement precision and the types of mea-
surements available or descriptions deemed relevant. Because of this, the status
of the reductive relationship between different theories may change over time:
two theories that were sufficiently similar in their shared domain of applica-
tion may come apart as measurements become more precise or more types of
measurement become possible. In this sense, although the concept of reduction
investigated here is not of a process occurring in time (i.e., diachronic reduc-
tion), the relevant reduction relation to examine can depend on empirical facts
or data known at a particular time.
3.3 An Example: Theories of Gravitation
As an example, from which I will continue to draw in the remainder, consider
the case of Einstein’s theory of general relativity and Newton’s theory of gravi-
tation.19 In order to compare the two theories, it is helpful to construct a general
framework for space-time models that encompasses both. I shall in particular
adapt the frame theory (Ehlers, 1981, 1991, 1998), which takes a space-time
to be an object (M, tab, sab, κ,∇a, T ab), where M is a smooth, paracompact
real manifold of events, tab and sab are, respectively, the temporal and spatial
metrics, κ ∈ R is the so-called causality constant, ∇a is a torsion-free affine con-
nection, and T ab is the stress-energy tensor representing the presence of energy
and momentum in the space-time. Given any curve γ : I → M , the temporal
metric determines the duration γ as
∫
I
√
tabξaξb ds if it is timelike, i.e., its tan-
gent vector ξa satisfies tabξaξb > 0. Similarly, the spatial metric determines the
length of γ as
∫
I
√
sabξaξb ds if it is spacelike, i.e., when ξa is covector satisfying
19 This subsection is largely based on Fletcher (2014, Ch. 3).
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sabξa = ξb and sabξaξb > 0 on γ[I]. (While in general there will be many such
covectors, the length of a spacelike curve is independent of the choice among
them (Malament, 2012, p. 255).)
These objects satisfy two further conditions:
Causality tabsbc = −κδca, where δ is the Kronecker delta tensor.
Compatibility ∇atbc = 0 and ∇asbc = 0.
The causality condition ensures that the timelike and spacelike directions at
each event, as described by the tangent vectors there, are disjoint. The com-
patibility condition ensures that the standards of constancy determined by the
affine connection match those of the temporal and spatial metrics: a quantity or
field is changing with respect to the former whenever it is changing with respect
to one of the latter.
The frame theory is not intended as a physical theory in its own right, but
rather as a theoretical framework in which one can describe both relativistic
and non-relativistic models of space-time and gravitation. One can see that the
models of general relativity (M, gab), where M is the space-time manifold of
event and gab is a Lorentz metric, are models of the frame theory as follows:
– the temporal metric is just tab = gab;
– the spatial metric is sab = −κgab, where κ = 1/c2 and c is the speed of
light;
– ∇a is the unique Levi-Civita connection compatible with gab; and
– the stress-energy tensor is constrained by the Ricci tensor Rmn associated
with ∇a according to a version of Einstein’s equation,
T ab = 18piGκ2
(
samsbn − 12s
absmn
)
Rmn,
where G is Newton’s gravitational constant.20
To show that models of Newtonian gravitation are models of the frame
theory requires a bit more work. First, I will exhibit how models of Newton-
Cartan theory are models of the frame theory. Newton-Cartan theory is also
known as “geometrized” Newtonian gravitation because, like general relativity,
it represents the phenomenon of gravitation as a manifestation of curvature, but
in the context of a non-relativistic space-time structure. Second, I will record
how the models of standard Newtonian gravitation are, in a suitable sense,
empirically equivalent with a subclass of those of Newton-Cartan theory.
20 For more on the formalism of general relativity, see, e.g., Hawking and Ellis (1973) or
Malament (2012, Ch. 2).
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Models of Newton-Cartan theory are of the form (M, tab, sab,∇a, T ab),
where tab is a temporal metric of signature (+, 0, 0, 0), sab is a spatial metric
of signature (0,+,+,+), ∇a is a connection compatible with tab and sab, and
the stress energy tensor T ab is constrained by the so-called geometrized Poisson
equation, Rab = 4piρtab, where ρ = tabT ab is the mass density, and Rab is the
Ricci tensor associated with the connection. Additionally, the temporal and
spatial metrics satisfy the condition tabsbc = 0. Hence, these are models of
the frame theory with κ = 0. This ensures that the structure of a Netwon-
Cartan spacetime is non-relativistic, i.e., the manifold of events foliates into
hypersurfaces of space at a time.21
Now, a more traditional formulation of Newtonian gravitation theory would
take as its models structures of the form (M, tab, sab,∇a, T ab, φ), where the tem-
poral and spatial metrics are as in the Newton-Cartan case, but the connection
is taken to be flat, and the constraints on the stress-energy tensor are instead
connected with a new field, the gravitational potential φ, according to Poisson’s
equation, sab∇a∇bφ = 4piρ. But there are systematic connections between the
two theories. The one of most relevance for present purposes is expressed in the
following proposition:
Proposition 10. Let (M, tab, sab,∇a, T ab, φ) be a model of Newtonian gravita-
tion. Then there is a unique connection ∇′ such that:
1. (M, tab, sab,∇′a, T ab) is a model of Newton-Cartan theory;
2. for all timelike curves in M with tangent vector field ξa, ξn∇′nξa = 0 iff
ξn∇nξa = −sab∇bφ; and
3. the Ricci curvature tensor R′ab associated with ∇′a satisfies the geometrized
Poisson equation, R′ab = 4piρtab.
Every model of Newtonian gravitation theory is thus empirically equivalent to a
model of Newton-Cartan theory, in the sense that all features of the former are
the same, except all and only acceleration due to gravity has been replaced by
geodesic motion in a space-time whose Ricci curvature satisfies the geometrized
Poisson equation.22 In general there will be many models of Newtonian grav-
21 For more on the formalism of Newton-Cartan theory, see, e.g., Malament (2012, Ch.
4).
22 In more detail, if one takes models of Newtonian gravitation whose gravitational
potentials and connections are related by gauge transformations φ 7→ φ + ψ with
sacsbd∇b∇dφ = 0 and ∇ 7→ (∇′, tbcsad∇dψ) to have the same representational capac-
ities, then Newtonian gravitation is theoretically equivalent to a sector of Newton-Cartan
theory, where this equivalence is understood as an equivalence of categories preserving
empirical content (Weatherall, 2016).
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itation associated in this way with a model of Newton-Cartan theory, but the
point is that if models in the frame theory are related by similarity relations
which depend only on empirical content, then exhibiting a reduction of general
relativity to Newton-Cartan theory suffices to do so for Newtonian gravitation.
Thus, the next step is to formulate the relevant similarity relations in terms of
empirical similarity on the models of the frame theory.
I shall consider two cases. Both take as the relevant criteria of compari-
son pointwise similarity of any scalar fields constructible from the temporal and
spatial metrics, the stress-energy tensor, their derivatives up to order k, and
frame fields, the lattermost representing the idealized measuring instruments
associated with observers. These fields represent possibly empirically measur-
able quantities in the spacetime. Both cases also restrict attention to when the
spacetime models under comparison are defined on diffeomorphic (really, the
same) manifolds of events. They differ only on which sorts of regions in which
these fields should be compared. In the first case, these will only be compact
(i.e., bounded) regions of spacetime. In the second case, these will be any regions
of spacetime.
To formalize these ideas, consider any frame field {0ea, 1ea, 2ea, 3ea}, letting hab
be the Riemannian metric which is the inverse of hab =
∑3
i=0
i
ea
i
eb. For any
tensor field F a1...anb1...bm defined where hab is, one can define its h-norm field as
|F |h =
(
ha1c1 · · ·hancnhb1d1 · · ·hbmdmF a1...anb1...bm F
c1...cn
d1...dm
)1/2
.
The h-norm field of F a1...anb1...bm is its Frobenius norm with respect to h—a field on
M that describes the magnitude of F a1...anb1...bm by the square root of the sum of its
squared components.
The h-norm of the difference between two tensor fields F a1...anb1...bm and F
′a1...an
b1...bm
,
denoted |F ′−F |h, therefore measures how dissimilar the two are. So an observer
(or observers) represented by a frame field determining a Riemannian metric h
might judge two temporal metrics, say, to be similar when the h-norm of their
difference does not exceed some value  on a region S. And that observer might
judge two spacetimes to be similar when not just their temporal metrics, but all
their tensorial structure, is judged to be similar in this way.
In this vein, consider the following similarity relations, defined for each h
determined by a frame field,  > 0, and compact region C ⊆M :
(M, t′ab, s′ab,∇′a, T ′ab) ∼h,,S (M, tab, sab,∇a, T ab)
iff
sup
C
|t′ − t|h <  & sup
C
|s′ − s|h <  & sup
C
|∇′ −∇|h <  & sup
C
|T ′ − T |h < ,
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When closed under intersection, the resulting similarity structure is topological
for the models of the frame theory, and its induced topology is known as the
(C0 product) compact-open topology.23
Combining propositions 9 and 2 with the definition of reduction and the
observations of Fletcher (2014, p. 65) yields the following proposition.
Proposition 11. Suppose the models of the frame theory are equipped with a sim-
ilarity structure, yielding a topological similarity space whose induced topology is
the compact-open topology. Then the models of general relativity partially reduce
the models of Newton-Cartan theory, hence the models of Newtonian gravitation.
This proposition takes advantage of the fact that, for partial reduction, it suffices
to show that there is a sequence of models xn of general relativity that becomes
arbitrarily similar to a model x of Newton-Cartan theory, i.e., the sequence
converges to x in the topology induced by the similarity structure. This can
be done with a sequence of Minkowski spacetime, which converge to Galilean
spacetime. It is an open question whether the reduction is merely partial or in
fact complete with respect to this or some other relevant similarity structure.
If the compact regions C in the above definition are then broadened to
include any regions S ⊆ M , the result is still a topological similarity space
but one whose induced topology, the open topology, is in general finer—has
more open sets—than the compact-open topology. The nature of the relationship
between general relativity and Newtonian gravitation is rather different with
respect to this more discerning similarity structure.
Proposition 12. Suppose the models of the frame theory are equipped with a sim-
ilarity structure, yielding a topological similarity space whose induced topology is
the open topology. Then the models of general relativity fail to reduce the models
of Newton-Cartan theory, hence the models of Newtonian gravitation.
Which of the two similarity structures is more apt to explaining the success of
Newtonian gravitation? While the second is more comprehensive in its criteria
of comparison between the theories, there is good reason to believe that this
23 I have made a few simplifications in the presentation of the compact-open topology.
First, the ambiguity of the third conjunct can be resolved by noting that differences be-
tween affine connections can be assessing according to their (1,2)-tensorial connecting
fields. Second, I have supposed that the derivatives of these tensor fields are not rele-
vant for this context, but they can be easily included by including more conjunctions
of bounded suprema of derivatives (taken with the connection compatible with h) of
differences between these fields. See Fletcher (2014) for these details.
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comprehensiveness extends far beyond the domain of successful application of
the theory. Notably, it has not been so successful at cosmology. Rather, the
success of Newton’s theory has been confined to applications for bounded re-
gions of spacetime, such as the observed history of a galaxy, various satellites
within our solar system, and the falling of terrestrial objects. The first structure
includes similarity relations which depend on these, but not on those which, sur-
veying unbounded regions of spacetime, do not make a difference in explaining
Newtonian gravitation’s success. Thus this first structure is presently the more
contextually appropriate of the two for the question of intertheoretic reduction.
3.4 Comparisons with Other Accounts of Intertheoretic
Reduction
In this section I contrast briefly the present framework for intertheoretic re-
duction based on similarity structure with three others, those of Nagel (1961),
Schaffner (1967), and their followers, and the structuralists (Schmidt, 2014).
For the former, I will focus on the Generalized Nagel-Schaffner (GNS) model as
articulated by Dizadji-Bahmani et al. (2010). In this model, a theory T is sup-
plemented with auxiliary assumptions (such as boundary conditions) from which
a more constrained theory T ∗ is deduced. Then one adds so-called “bridge prin-
ciples” to T ∗ that unify its vocabulary with that of another theory T ′, yielding
T ′∗. Then, if T ′∗ makes at least as accurate predictions as T ′ yet is still “strongly
analogous” to T ′, then T is said to reduce T ′.
The similarity structure-based framework I am proposing here is aligned
with the GNS model in some ways and opposed to it in others. Somewhat like
how the GNS model uses bridge principles, reduction in terms of similarity struc-
tures demands that there be a common basis—say, of empirical descriptions—on
which the two theories are compared. However, in the GNS model every term
of the two theories must be bridged for there to be a complete reduction, while
in my framework this is only necessary for the terms relevant (i.e., those that
make a difference) to the explanatory context arising from the models consid-
ered. The function of strong analogy in the GNS model is comparable to that
of the similarity structure in mine: both provide a contextual way of compar-
ing two theories, although in the present framework the structure of similarity
is both more concrete and richer than in the GNS model. Thus, in contrast to
Dizadji-Bahmani et al. (2010, p. 409) and Butterfield (2011a, p. 939), who coun-
cil giving up on the project of a precise characterization of analogy, similarity
structure provides as much precision as can be made about the models of the
theories themselves and which differences between them make a difference.
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Auxiliary assumptions are often required for the GNS model to guarantee
that T ′ (or T ′∗) can be deduced, which must therefore always be consistent with
the deducing one. But in the similarity structure-based account, the relation-
ship between the theories under consideration is not one of deduction, even with
aspects of similarity are taken into account, and accordingly the supplementa-
tion of the reducing theory T with auxiliary assumptions is no longer needed.
Instead, one exhibits a relationship between the models of two theories based on
a contextually determined similarity structure. In this sense, rather than adding
to what is assumed, one is subtracting by considering a broader class of pos-
sibilities encompassing both theories. Indeed, the reducing theory need not be
consistent with the reduced theory at all, as the case of the (at least partial)
reduction of Newtonian gravitation by general relativity demonstrates.24 In the
(very!) special case in which the models of the reduced theory can be shown
to be models of the reducing theory—in the sense of having isomorphic prop-
erties relevant to the context—the GNS framework itself can be construed (cf.
proposition 1) as a special case of the similarity-structure account.
After the development of the Nagelian account was underway, others began
to propose alternatives. Nickles (1973) contrasted this account with one that
describes the reduction of one theory by another as the result of applying a
“limit operation” (or some other operation O that need not be purely logical)
on the latter to arrive at the former. Schematically, one might write limT =
T ′ or more generally O(T ) = T ′, with the operation perhaps depending on a
“fundamental parameter” of T (Batterman, 2016, §2). What kinds of operations
legitimately fall under this class, though? Indeed, one of the criticisms of this
approach has been that what they are supposed to be or how they are to be
delimited is quite vague (Schaffner, 1976; Rosaler, 2015). Consequently, various
authors—e.g., Butterfield (2011b) and Rosaler (2015)—have attempted to make
this precise—as a limit of models or of approximation of observed trajectories
of a dynamical system, respectively. In particular, Rosaler focuses on the case
of dynamical systems at different “levels” with a shared time parameter, using
a so-called “bridge map” to compare the induced dynamics of one theory inside
another, concluding that reduction occurs when the induced trajectory in state
space is approximately the same as the trajectory given by the dynamics in that
theory.25
24 Now, Dizadji-Bahmani et al. (2010) do remark that consistency only holds between
T and T ′∗, not necessarily with T ′, but the point is that there may be no particular
“strongly analogous” theory consistent with T that is deduced at all.
25 While Rosaler (2015, p. 67) acknowledges that his theory has many affinities with
Nickles’s schema, he sees it as well to be in the spirit of the Nagel model. What’s important
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As with the GNS model, the framework based on similarity structures has
both points of alignment and difference with these precise versions of Nickles’s
schema. According to propositions 1 and 2 and definition 16, the convergence
of a sequence of models of one theory to a model of another implies that the
former theory reduces the limit model. Hence, if this holds for all models of the
other theory, that theory is reduced, too. In the case of Rosaler’s account, if one
assumes that the bridge maps preserve the empirical predictions (or whatever
other features are contextually relevant) of the models of the theory they act
upon, then his concept of reduction is also a case of reduction in the similarity
structure-based approach much like that of the toy example on page 3.2.
The main significant differences with these are twofold. First, similarity
structure-based approach is quite more general. As proposition 2 demonstrates,
sequential convergence is sufficient but not necessary for reduction; there may
be models of one theory that are arbitrarily similar to those of another in all
the relevant ways, but which are not the limits of models of the latter. And
unlike the theory of Rosaler (2015), the similarity structure-based approach is
not restricted to dynamical systems with a shared time variable: it is general
enough to apply to any models or theories whose models can be described with
sufficient precision.
The second important difference is that—perhaps surprisingly—essentially
none of authors who have engaged with variations of Nickles’s schema have com-
mented on the essential role that the choice of topological (or, more generally,
similarity) structure plays in describing the relationship between theories as rep-
resented by their models. While Butterfield (2011b, p. 1075) seems to acknowl-
edge that topological structure is the basis for the definition of the convergence
of a sequence in the general case, he does not address how this structure is de-
termined or its justification. Similarly, while Rosaler (2015) acknowledges that
the degree of approximation needed for reduction of dynamical systems theories
must be contextual, he assumes, without argument, that a Euclidean distance
function on the systems’ state space is the relevant way to determine that ap-
proximation. As this review emphasizes, though, and as I previously described
in detail in the case of theories of gravitation (Fletcher, 2016), it is essential to
show how the structure picked out captures the all and only the features relevant
for answering the explanatory question that reduction asks. The framework of
similarity structure makes this task central.
for my comparison here is not so much the classification of Rosaler’s theory as its points
of alignment and difference with the present similarity structure-based approach. See also
Atmanspacher and beim Graben (2009) and references therein for a similar apparatus,
but focusing more on defining emergence rather than reduction.
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Finally, I shall compare the present framework with that of the structural-
ists. As with the others, there are points of similarity and difference. It is more
difficult to characterize univocally what the structuralist position is on reduction
because of the heterogeneity of the positions advocated by the authors described
by that label (Schmidt, 2014). That said, it is fair to say that the structuralist
position of reduction aims to characterize it in terms of showing how the models
of one theory approximate those of another, with the notion of approximation
formalized in terms of structure on those models, so-called “inaccuracy-sets.” On
this feature, there is alignment: both the structuralist and similarity structure-
based approach use structure on the models of theories to compare them and
give a definition of reduction relations. However, inaccuracy-sets are assumed
to satisfy more formal conditions than similarity relations—in particular, uni-
form structures26—and are to encode some concept of empirical approximation
(Mayr, 1981). Although this case is very important, similarity relations are not
restricted to them. Also, analogously with the elaborations on Nickles’s limit
schema, the structuralist approach took the theory itself to require a single such
uniform structure, while I allow for the similarity structure to vary by context.27
In sum, the structuralist position also places structure on the models of a the-
ory in service of answering questions about intertheoretic reduction, but this
structure encodes only empirical descriptions, is non-contextual, and is stronger
(assumes more) than the present approach.
4 Emergent Properties
4.1 The Concept of Emergence
O’Connor and Wong (2015) aptly remark: “Emergence is a notorious philosoph-
ical term of art,” one with a variety of conflicting usages and definitions. The
sort of emergence of concern here is that of one or more properties of a system
or state of affairs, as described by one theory, from that provided by another
26 A base for a uniform structure is obtained by a topological family of similarity rela-
tions, each of which is symmetric.
27 Moulines (1980) allows different subsets of a single uniform structure to be applicable
in different contexts, but this only lets the degree of similarity vary by context, rather
than the type. Moulines (1976) also allows for two uniform structures, one on the possible
models and another for the ‘partial’ possible models, which contain only non-theoretical
terms, but these are required to be strictly compatible, so this is not really contextualist
about similarity.
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theory. Whether this is metaphysical or merely epistemological emergence will
depend on whether one’s (contextually appropriate) attitude toward the theo-
ries in question is more realist or anti-realist, but that question can be set aside
for present purposes, as its answer does not substantively affect the formal fea-
tures of the analysis. Further, just as the notion of reduction that I developed
in §3 was synchronic in the sense of treating the relationships between theories
rather than a dynamical or historical process, the notion of emergence here is
also synchronic in the same way: it will describe the relationships of models of
theories and novel properties thereof, not how properties of systems or states of
affairs arise in time.
Informally, on the present account, a property of a model is emergent with
respect to another class of models just when it is comparatively novel. This
novelty can come in degrees, so I distinguish four different types of emergence
partially ordered in strength. The weakest, weak emergence, requires only mere
non-identity of the property—or the value of that property, if it is not a simple
predicative property—of the model with any of the properties of the models in
the comparison class. One might require not just mere non-identity, though, but
a sort of unexpectedness or inexplicability. This can be formalized along at least
two directions. The strong emergence of a property of a model requires that the
property must also be not sufficiently similar to the properties of the models
of the comparison class—it is unexpected because it is not even similar (in the
relevant ways) to the properties available for consideration from the comparison
class. This requires similarity structure on the values that a property can take
on. The non-reductive emergence of a property of a model requires that the
property must also be non-identical with the corresponding properties of the
models arbitrarily similar to those in the comparison class—it is inexplicable
in the sense that . This requires similarity structure on the joint collection of
models. Finally, radical emergence is just the conjunction of strong and non-
reductive emergence: the emergent property is not even sufficiently similar to
the properties of the models arbitrarily similar to those in the comparison class.
Accordingly, this requires similarity structure on both the space of values that a
property can take on and the joint collection of models themselves. All of these
concepts readily generalize from applying only to properties of individual models
to the properties of sets of models.
Contrary to common usage, two of these concepts of emergence—the weak
and strong varieties—will not only be compatible with reduction as developed in
§3, but will often be a consequence of it. Indeed, after describing the more formal
definitions of emergence using similarity structure in section 4.2, I formulate
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and prove some propositions to this effect.28 This is because, in the present
account, the one is not defined in terms of the failure of the other. Section
4.3 takes up the example of general relativity and Newtonian gravitation from
section 3.3 again, arguing that absolute simultaneity is an emergent according
to the different similarity structures previously considered. Finally, section 4.4
compares the present account of emergence in terms of similarity structure to
two others that seem to me to be most related: that of Primas (1998), Bishop
and Atmanspacher (2006), and Atmanspacher and beim Graben (2009), and
that of Butterfield (2011a,b, 2014) and Bouatta and Butterfield (2012, 2015).
4.2 Similarity Structures and Emergent Properties
To begin, let X be a set of models represent some possible states of affairs, and
consider a possible property that some of these models might represent. One can
represent it with a certain map on X as follows.
Definition 17. A valuation of a property on a collection of models X is a (per-
haps partial) map ν : X 9 V , where V is called its space of (property) values.
Further, if x ∈ X is (not) in the domain of ν, then the property represented by
ν is said to be (not) definable for x.
Philosophers will already be familiar with (classical) propositional properties,
those which either obtain or not for a given model. For example, “being red”
is a propositional property as applying to (some model of) everyday objects.
Such properties have the Boolean domain {>,⊥} as their values. But properties
as I have considered them here can also include quantities, such as “having (a
certain) mass,” whose space of values might be the real interval (0,∞), or even
more complex structures.
Now suppose that X has been equipped with a similarity structure S with
closeness operator clS and a valuation ν : X 9 V , whose space of property
values V has also been equipped with a similarity structure V with closeness
operator clV .
Definition 18. With respect to the models A ⊆ X, the values ν[B] of a collection
of models B ⊆ X are said to be:
28 I am not the first to suggest the compatibility of emergence with reduction, when the
two are construed appropriately. See, for example, Wimsatt (1997, 2000), Primas (1998),
Bishop and Atmanspacher (2006), and Butterfield (2011a,b), some of whose positions I
consider in more detail in section 4.4.
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1. weakly emergent when ν[B] * ν[A], and completely weakly emergent when
in addition ν[B] ∩ ν[A] = ∅;
2. strongly emergent when ν[B] * clV(ν[A]), and completely strongly emergent
when in addition ν[B] ∩ clV(ν[A]) = ∅;
3. non-reductively emergent when ν[B] * ν[clS(A)], and completely non-
reductively emergent when in addition ν[B] ∩ ν[clS(A)] = ∅; and
4. radically emergent when ν[B] * clV(ν[clS(A)]), and completely radically
emergent when in addition ν[B] ∩ clV(ν[clS(A)]) = ∅.
Any of these types of emergence is said to be partial when it is not complete.29
Logically, radical emergence entails the other three types of emergence, while
weak emergence is entailed by the other three. In general, neither strong emer-
gence nor non-reductive emergence entails the other. And in each of these cases,
emergence can obtain either because the property valuations are definable for
the models of A but different for the models of B, or they are not definable for
the models of A.
In order for values of a property of models of B to be weakly emergent, no
similarity structure on the space of models or property values is needed. The
weakly emergent values of a property of models of B with respect to A are
just those that are at least partially novel with respect to those of the models
of A. Strong emergence obtains when values of a property of models of B are
not only different from those of models of A, but also from all those arbitrarily
similar to those values.30 Thus similarity structure on the space of values of a
property valuation is necessary for them to be strongly emergent. Non-reductive
emergence, by contrast, requires only similarity structure on the models of X. It
obtains when the values of a property of the models of B are novel with respect
to those of the models of A and all the models arbitrarily similar to those in A.
Finally, values of a property of models of B are radically emergent just when
they are novel with respect to those even arbitrarily similar to the values of
29 Beyond these latter three, one can define infinitely many concepts of emergence based
on iterations of the closeness operators: with respect to the models A ⊆ X, the val-
ues ν[B] of a collection of models B ⊆ X can be said to be (n,m)-emergent when
ν[B] * clnV(ν[clmS (A)]). However, if the similarity structures on the spaces of models and
property values are topological, then their closeness operators are in fact topological clo-
sure operators, which are idempotent. In this case, the above four concepts are the only
ones that are distinct.
30 Thus these precise characterizations of weak and strong emergence ought to mollify
skeptical concerns that the criterion “novelty” is too vague without it being defined in
terms of other criteria for emergence (Teller, 1992).
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the models arbitrarily similar to those of A. Radical emergence thus requires
similarity structures both on the property value space and the space of models.
There are several important features of the present graded account of emer-
gence worth mentioning. First, it is relational, holding between the property
values of some models and some other collection of models of an “appropriate
comparison class” (Butterfield, 2011a, p. 922) from which the question of novelty
or unexpectedness is posed. Changing this class may therefore change whether a
property is emergent. This is as expected: if emergent properties are to be novel
or unexpected, they can only be so with respect to such a class of expected
properties.
Second, whether a set of values of a property are emergent in any sense
stronger than weak depends on similarity structure, which is determined relative
to a context of investigation. This shows how this sense of emergence can be
sensitive to both the epistemological and pragmatic situation of an investigator,
as the family of similarity relations determined (whether on the property value
space or the space of models) depends on what makes a difference for the kinds
of explanatory questions being asked.
Third, that certain values of a property are emergent does not imply that
they are interesting (Teller, 1992). Whether a property is interesting, after all,
generally depends on its implications for other sorts of inquiries and activities
beyond its mere novelty or unexpectedness. One might nevertheless anticipate it
to be somewhat likely that strongly emergent values of a property are interesting,
provided the comparison class of models are informative about the values of the
property as well. If the similarity structure on the space of property values is
properly selected in a certain context of investigation, it will track differences
that could make a difference to that context. Because strongly emergent values
of a property are not even (closely) similar to those holding for the models of
their comparison class, they are different in ways that could make a difference.
Fourth, both weak and strong emergence, but not non-reductive emergence,
are compatible with complete reduction as described in the previous section.
That is, it’s possible for one theory to reduce another, yet for the models of the
reduced theory to have emergent values of properties with respect to the models
of the reducing theory. This can arise precisely because there may be models
of the reduced theory, arbitrarily similar to those of the reducing theory, that
nevertheless have values for a property that are not even similar to those of the
reducing theory, as is the case with strong emergence.31 This is not possible
31 One can induce a unique smallest similarity structure on a space of models from
similarity structures on the spaces of relevant property values, analogously with the initial
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with non-reductive emergence, however; indeed, non-reductive emergence is a
sufficient condition for the failure of total reduction. These observations are
collected and strengthened slightly in the following proposition.
Proposition 13. Let (X,S) be a similarity space with closeness operator clS ,
and suppose that T reduces T ′ completely, with T, T ′ ⊆ X.
1. If T ′ ⊆ T , then ν[T ′] is not weakly emergent for any property valuation
ν : X 9 V .
2. If T ′ * T , then ν[T ′] is strongly emergent for some property valuation ν :
X 9 V but non-reductively emergent for none.
Proof. 1. By hypothesis that T ′ ⊆ T , ν[T ′] ⊆ ν[T ] for any property valuation
ν : X 9 V .
2. Let χT : X → {0, 1} be the characteristic function for T and V be a sim-
ilarity structure on {0, 1} consisting only of the relation {(0, 0), (1, 1)}; χT
is a valuation of a property on X. By hypothesis, χT [T ′] = {0, 1} while
clV(χT [T ]) = {1}. Hence χT [T ′] is partially strongly emergent.
To show that ν[T ′] is non-reductively emergent for no property valuation
ν, note that by the assumption of complete reduction, T ′ ⊆ clS [T ], hence
ν[T ′] ⊆ ν[clS(T )].
The compatibility of some types of emergence with reduction may sound like a
radical conclusion if one assumes that emergence is close to being the negation
of reduction, but it is in fact entirely natural here, where they are not: once
one compares definitions 16 and 18, one sees that explaining the success of one
theory from the perspective of another simply allows for former to have novel
features.
4.3 An Example: Absolute Simultaneity
To understand these different grades of emergence and their properties, it is
helpful to analyze some examples. In particular, I will take the case of the New-
tonian and relativistic theories of gravitation discussed in section 3.3, and the
(weak) topology induced on a space from a set of maps that take the space as its domain
(Willard, 1970, §8). In such cases, one can show that any strongly emergent properties
in the models of a theory to which any theory reduces cannot be ones which make a
difference in the similarity structure on the models. For example, if the similarity structure
the encodes similarity of certain sorts of empirical descriptions, then no strongly emergent
property can make a difference for those sorts of empirical descriptions.
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property of having a concept of objective simultaneity. As is well known, one of
the hallmark features of relativistic spacetimes is that simultaneity is in general
relative to an observer, in the sense that different observers may determine dif-
ferent classes of events to be simultaneous with one another.32 By contrast, a
spacetime theory has a concept of objective simultaneity just when its assign-
ments of simultaneity to different events depends only on the spacetime struc-
ture itself, rather than on, say, particular worldlines. Non-relativistic spacetimes
have a concept of objective simultaneity determined directly from their temporal
metric. So, in comparing the models of the two theories, we may assess whether
objective simultaneity is emergent, and in what sense. Let TR be the models of
general relativity and TN be the models of Newtonian gravitation, both of which
are strict disjoint subsets of the models of the frame theory TF described in the
previous section. Further, let νs : TF → {>,⊥} be the property valuation whose
value is > when evaluated on a model with a concept of objective simultaneity,
and is ⊥ otherwise. Clearly, then, objective simultaneity is completely weakly
emergent in the models of Newtonian gravitation with respect to the models
of general relativity because νs[TN ] = {>} and νs[TR] = {⊥} are disjoint. Ob-
jective simultaneity is simply a novel property in Newtonian gravitation with
respect to relativity theory.
Is objective simultaneity also strongly, non-reductively, or radically emer-
gent? Answering these questions requires justifying a choice of similarity struc-
ture on the property value space {>,⊥}, the space of models TF , or both,
respectively. To begin with the question of strong emergence, a quite natural
similarity structure V for the property value space would consist just in the
relation ∼T = {(>,>), (⊥,⊥)}, which asserts that only (not) having a propo-
sitional property is similar to (not) having that property, i.e., “true” is similar
to “true,” and “false” to “false.” (This singleton set of similarity relations is
topological, and the canonical topology it generates is the discrete topology.) It
follows that clV({⊥}) = {⊥}, hence objective simultaneity is completely strongly
emergent in the models of Newtonian gravitation with respect to the models of
general relativity.
In section 4.3, two sorts of topological families of similarity relations were
introduced for TF , one whose induced topology is the compact-open topology,
and the other whose induced topology is the open topology. As shown there
in proposition 11, if the former is adopted for the models of the frame theory,
32 In Minkowski spacetime—the domain of special relativity—all observers always agree
that timelike-related events are not simultaneous with one another, but may determine
different sets of spacelike-related events to be simultaneous. In an arbitrary relativistic
spacetime, this holds for events and observers sufficiently local to one another.
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TF , then in fact TN ∩ clS(TR) 6= ∅, i.e., the models of general relativity par-
tially reduce the models of Newtonian gravitation. Thus, since every model of
Newtonian gravitation has a concept of objective simultaneity, νs[clS(TR)] =
{>,⊥}, hence νs[TN ] ⊆ νs[clS(TR)], meaning objective simultaneity is not non-
reductively emergent, as one would expect from proposition 13. Similarity, since
νs[clS(TR)] ⊆ clV(νs[clS(TR)]), it would also not be radically emergent. How-
ever, if the open topology is adopted for the models of general relativity, then
TN ∩ clS(TR) = ∅, i.e., the models of general relativity fail to reduce the models
of Newtonian gravitation. Since νs[TN ∩ clS(TR)] = νs[TN ]∩ νs[clS(TR)], it fol-
lows that objective simultaneity would be completely non-reductively emergent.
In fact, it would be radically emergent, as νs[clS(TR)] = {⊥} would imply that
clV(νs[clS(TR)]) = {⊥}.
Which of these is the “right” verdict? Is objective simultaneity radically
emergent, or merely strongly emergent in the Newtonian theory? I have argued
that, to this question, there is in general no context-free answer, one which
depends only on the formal structure of the two theories. For instance, if the
goal is a description of the properties of Newtonian spacetimes that are in various
ways novel compared with those of relativistic spacetimes in light of the former’s
success in actual empirical descriptions, then, as I argued in section 3.3, there is
good reason to believe that the compact-open topology is a better choice than
the open topology. But if the goal is such a description in light of a “global view”
of the features of spacetime, regardless of whether they are reflected in what is
observable in the models, then the open topology may be a better.
4.4 Comparisons with Other Accounts of Emergent
Properties
Various other authors have discussed senses of emergence that share features
of the present account based on similarity structure. Here I discuss two: that
of Primas (1998), Bishop and Atmanspacher (2006), and Atmanspacher and
beim Graben (2009); and that of Butterfield (2011a,b, 2014) and Bouatta
and Butterfield (2012, 2015). The former call their characterization contextual
emergence, which “utilizes lower level features as necessary (but not sufficient)
conditions for the description of higher-level features” (Atmanspacher and
beim Graben, 2009). To exhibit cases of contextual emergence, these authors
consider a theory in which systems of interest occupy a single state in a state
space of a lower-level theory, which is equipped with a “fundamental topology”
determining which trajectories or curves in the state space are continuous (and
thus are candidates for representing change over time). One then considers
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which properties and differences between states make a difference to the context
of investigation, coarse-graining or partitioning the state space into equivalence
classes of states that, as far as this context is concerned, are indistinguishable:
their elements have amongst themselves only differences that do not make a
difference (e.g., are not measurable by certain context-dependent apparatus).
The equivalence classes of the partition then form the elements of a new state
space for the higher-level theory, with the associated quotient topology. The
elements of this new higher-level state space may have properties that are not
definable in the lower-level state space, even though those properties supervene
on lower-level properties.33 But in any case, this partitioning must be com-
patible with the fundamental topology in the sense that its quotient should
commute with the dynamics at each level.34
The approach of contextual emergence shares with the present similarity
structure-based approach a commitment to the importance and necessity of
context for describing the relationships between different levels or theories, re-
spectively. It also shares the use of topological structure in its analysis, but in
somewhat different ways. Contextual emergence assumes and does not attempt
to justify its “fundamental” topology on the lower-level state space, which is
used only in ensuring that the coarse-graining commutes with the fundamental
dynamics. By contrast, the present approach assumes neither of these: there
need not be any “fundamental” similarity structure or requirements of com-
muting with dynamics. Indeed, the present approach does not assume that the
models of the two theories to be related are related by any coarse-graining oper-
ation at all, or that the models of these theories must be continuous trajectories
through state space. Rather, it builds (pre-)topological structure from families
of contextually justified similarity relations, which also play an important role
in defining three of the four principle types of emergence. However, while a more
thorough comparison of the two approaches is still needed, it seems that that
of contextual emergence can be subsumed by the that of similarity structure
33 These authors have in mind especially applications to the relationship between micro-
scopic, complex descriptions of multipartite systems and macroscopic, more phenomeno-
logical descriptions of these systems as a whole, as is the relationship between mechanics
and thermodynamics via statistical mechanics. Temperature is intended to be a contextu-
ally emergent property, for example. In these sorts of cases, the introduction of a context
is accompanied by a probability distribution on the state space, so that emergence can
arise not just from indistinguishable states, but also ignorance about what state is actual.
34 This sometimes requires restricting the lower-level theory’s state space, which these
authors call implementing a “stability” criterion, citing the KMS condition of quantum
statistical mechanics as an example.
34 Samuel C. Fletcher
considered here. The models related by coarse-graining a state space may still
be gathered together in a joint space and equipped with a similarity structure
so that a coarse-grained state may be arbitrarily similar to many different fine-
grained states, perhaps giving rise in the former to weakly or strongly emergent
properties.
These notions of emergence are also related to those presented by Butter-
field (2011a,b, 2014) and Bouatta and Butterfield (2012, 2015), who describe
emergence as “behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some comparison
class” (Butterfield, 2011b, p. 1066). Like them, my formalization of different
types of emergence is precisely a sort of relevant comparative novelty. Unlike
them, I consider the robustness of a property to be better understood an episte-
mological criteria about inferences using the models, not about what the models
represent—see section 5. While I am sympathetic to demanding that an inter-
esting novel (i.e., emergent) property be robust sensu Butterfield and Bouatta,
I find it helpful to distinguish the representational issues from the inferential
ones. (Indeed, one finds in their later expositions that robustness enters only
nominally (Bouatta and Butterfield, 2015) or not at all (Butterfield, 2014).)
Now, despite describing emergence as requiring a sort of comparative nov-
elty, Butterfield and Bouatta never give a formal definition of “novelty”. The
closest they seem to come to doing so is the following: “Here ‘novel’ means
something like: ‘not definable from the comparison class’, and maybe ‘showing
features (maybe striking ones) absent from the comparison class’ ” (Butterfield,
2011a, p. 921). My own formalization of novelty is in accordance with this: a
value of a property of a model is weakly emergent with respect to some other
models when it does not obtain in the latter, and weak emergence is necessary
for the other principle types of emergence I defined. Butterfield and Bouatta are
also concerned to argue that such emergence is compatible with reduction, as
I have done as well: one can have novelty properties in the models of a theory
while still being able to explain that theory’s success.
Another relevant point of comparison, and one about which they do say
more, is how they see emergence interfacing with limiting procedures. Butterfield
describes a “system”—a model in the sense I have been using the term—with
an emergent property as follows:
Often the system is a limit of a sequence of systems, typically as some parameter (in
the theory of the systems) goes to infinity (or some other crucial value, often zero);
and its properties and behaviour are novel and robust compared to those of systems
described with a finite (respectively: non-zero) parameter. (Butterfield, 2011a, p.
921fn)
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The “parameter,” usually a real-valued number, is here just a way of labeling
the ordered elements of the sequence—though it is usually one of interpretive
significance, this is not essential for making limits well-defined. In any case, this
is a special case of the notion of weak or strong emergence defined here, for
proposition 2 shows that the limit of a sequence of models of a theory, if it
exists, is certainly arbitrarily similar to those models, yet there may be other
models arbitrarily similar to those of the theory that are not the limits of any
sequences.
A further way in which the present work builds on that of Butterfield and
Bouatta—and shares with contextual emergence—is the analysis of the depen-
dence of emergence on the selection and justification of the relevant family of
similarity relations. Now, Butterfield (2011b, p. 1075) does mention that topo-
logical structure on properties themselves (what he calls “quantities”) is often
needed to define limits, in contrast to the values of the properties, which, assum-
ing that they are real numbers, have a canonical, natural topology. However, he
does not describe the motivation, choice, or interpretation for such a topology.
By contrast, I do not assume anything about the range of property values, e.g.,
that they be real numbers. Further, applying the analysis of section 2 shows how
(pre)topological structure on the models of a theory or the values of a property
arises not as a mere technical device on a space of property values, but from a
motivated choice of similarity structure.
One final point of comparison is worth mentioning. Butterfield (2011b, p.
1069) discusses two senses of emergence for a property, strong and weak, the
former applying to a novel property of a limit model and the latter applying
“before we get to the limit. That is: in each example [of emergence], one can
understand ‘novel and robust behaviour’ weakly enough that it does occur for
finite N”—that is, for elements of the sequence. Do these types of emergence fit
into the fourfold classification I have developed here? Yes, essentially. Butter-
field’s strong emergence is a special case of weak or strong emergence as I have
defined it. His weak emergence is also special case of weak or strong emergence,
one in which the similarity structure encodes only finitely precise empirical mea-
surements. For Butterfield, a property of a limit model is weakly emergent in a
particular modeling context when that model sufficiently satisfies that context’s
modeling criteria. Further descriptive precision does not make a difference to
that context, even though it would in other modeling contexts. For example,
one might fruitfully model the solar system as the interaction of various mas-
sive point particles under Newtonian gravitation in order, say, to send a space
probe to Jupiter. In this context, a concept of absolute simultaneity could be
said to be weakly emergent in Butterfield’s sense because it is known that in
fact some general relativistic model would be more descriptively accurate in
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another context (in a way that would make a difference in that context), even
though the Newtonian model suffices in this one. Thus weak emergence (in his
sense) applies to a property of a model relative to two contexts of investigation:
one in which the property counts as weakly or strongly emergent (in my sense)
and one—typically one for which strictly more differences make a difference—in
which it does not.
5 Modeling and Epistemology
5.1 The Principle of Stability
Scientists routinely build mathematical or computational models of a domain of
phenomena, then infer or explain properties about the domain from properties
of the models. The centrality of models to scientific practice indeed supports
their status as the basic unit of analysis in the present work. But such models
are almost always idealized (McMullin, 1985), misrepresenting (or omitting)
features of their domains in ways that are not always apparent. However, when
an idealization is relaxed so that the resulting model is more fully descriptively
accurate, the properties inferred and explanations gleaned from the model may
change. Yet much of the time this de-idealization is impractical—for otherwise
the idealizations typically would not have been made in the first place! How,
then, can inferences from idealized models be justified?
This is a problem considered not just in philosophy of science and epis-
temology, but within the sciences as well. For instance, the standard Fried-
mann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker (FLRW) cosmological model contains a past
singularity.35 It is from this feature that cosmologists infer the finite age of the
universe, the existence of a Big Bang. But this model also idealizes the content
of the universe as being homogeneous and isotropic: at every instant of cos-
mological time, the distribution of matter is the same everywhere and in every
direction. Thankfully, our experience hardly confirms such monotony. So how is
this inference to the existence of a Big Bang therefore warranted?
It is difficult to provide conditions of sufficiency for warrant or justification.
But the present framework of similarity structure affords the means to formulate
a necessary condition. Namely, one can require that the inference would still have
35 For more on these models, see, e.g., Hawking and Ellis (1973, Ch. 5.3) or Malament
(2012, Ch. 2.11).
Similarity Structure on Scientific Theories 37
been made if the idealization were relaxed or forced to hold only approximately—
that is:
Principle of Stability (Informal) If an inference from a property of a model
of a theory to a property of the world is to be justified, then the property
of the model must obtain on all sufficiently similar models.36
The idea is that the justification should not depend on the arbitrarily precise
selection of a single model. Once the models of a theory have been equipped
with similarity structure, this principle can be interpreted as demanding that
justified inference of a property of the world from a property of a model requires
that the property of the model holds also of all the models in some domain of a
similarity relation at that model.
Definition 19. Let (X,S) be a similarity space and ν : X 9 V a property
valuation. ν is stable at x ∈ X when there is someD(x) ∈ Bx such that ν[D(x)] =
{ν(x)}. Otherwise, it is unstable at x
Principle of Stability (Formal) For any property valuation ν on a similarity
space, if an inference from ν(x) = v to the corresponding property of the
world is justified, then ν is stable at x.
If the family of models is topological, then this is equivalent to the existence
of a topological neighborhood of the model, all of whose elements have the
property. This is just the concept of the stability of a property at a point of a
topological space. So, when similarity is encoded in topological structure, the
principle of stability takes the (topological) stability of a property of a model to
be a necessary condition for one to infer the corresponding property about the
world.
In light of this connection with similarity and topology, Fletcher (2016) has
suggests that physicists’ talk of the “physical significance” of a property of a
model just refers to the warrant to infer that property about the physical phe-
nomena the models describes. Thus when Hawking (1971, p. 395) asserts that
“the only properties of space-time that are physically significant are those that
are stable in some appropriate topology”, he means to assert a necessary con-
dition for inference from a (space-time) model to properties of the world to be
justified—a version of the principle of stability.37 An articulation of this prin-
36 This is analogous to what Jones (2006, §5.3) calls “Earman’s Principle,” which ap-
plies specifically to the stability inferences of effects from idealized systems under de-
idealization—see Earman (2004, p. 191).
37 See also Geroch (1971, p. 70) and Hawking and Ellis (1973, p. 197).
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ciple can already be found as early as that of Duhem (1954, Part II, Ch. III),
who argued that inferences and explanations from mathematical models of phe-
nomena (“mathematical deductions”) must satisfy an additional criterion if they
are not to be “otiose” and “condemned to eternal sterility.” In order to be “use-
ful” in real physical applications, a given inference from a mathematical model
must also be demonstrated to be approximately correct when the (idealized)
assumptions of the model are only approximately true.
In the remainder of this section I will not try to defend the principle of sta-
bility or describe any more of its history or classification as an epistemological
principle (even though those are worthy pursuits—see section 7.4). Rather, I will
confine attention to exploring a couple of the principle’s implications: the per-
vasiveness of unstable properties and the dependence of stability on the relevant
family of similarity relations.
How common should we expect unstable properties to be? There’s a certain
sense in which they are pervasive, as captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 14. Consider a similarity space (X,S). For any x ∈ X, if there
is some similarity relation in S with a domain at x that non-empty and no
similarity relation in S with a domain at x that is the singleton {x}, then the
property valuation χx : X → {>,⊥}, defined by
χx(y) =
{
> if y = x,
⊥ if y 6= x,
(1)
is unstable at x.
Proof. If the conditions of the hypothesis are satisfied for x ∈ X, then every
domain at x of a similarity relation on X contains both x and some y 6= x. Since
χx(y) = ⊥ when y 6= x while χx(y) = > when y = x, there is no non-empty
domain at x on which the values of χx are only >.
χx is a property valuation for “being x.” If one uses a model x to represent some
phenomenon, then the property represented by χx is just that x truly does rep-
resent the phenomenon. The above proposition shows that, if the context of
investigation determines that the only relevant ways in which models are sim-
ilar always makes one model similar to a distinct one, then “being represented
by a single particular model” is an unstable property. The principle of stability
then entails that one is never justified in inferring that just one particular model
represents the phenomena. Thus, quite pervasively, there are always some prop-
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erties of a model that one is not justified in inferring of the world, even though
one may be justified in using that model.38
In section 4.4, I described how Butterfield (2011a, p. 921) demanded that
emergent properties must be “robust,” in the sense of being “the same for var-
ious choices of, or assumptions about, the comparison class.” If this sense of
robustness is understood as a sort of stability of the property under perturba-
tions of the model used, then it is just an instance of stability in the sense of
this section. If this were right, then, as I suggested in section 4.4, this notion of
robustness would not be a necessary feature of emergent properties per se, but
would rather be, in the light of the principle of stability, a necessary condition for
one to infer such an emergent property of some phenomenon from a model. Such
robustness would therefore be at most a requirement for an emergent property
to be interesting or useful, not to exist.
5.2 An Example: Chronology and Causality in General
Relativity
Whether a property is robust or stable in this sense, though, depends crucially
on which other models are a part of the theory and on the family of similarity
relations placed on those models. For example, consider again relativity the-
ory. Some of its models exhibit closed timelike or causal curves, possible world-
histories of particles that loop back on themselves. These are widely considered
to be a sort of time travel, so spacetimes with closed timelike or causal curves
are said to violate chronology or causality, respectively, while those without are
respectively called chronological or causal. So, one can ask whether a spacetime
has any of these features stably, so that, according to the principle of stability,
they might be inferred of a world modeled by them. One central result about
this is the following (Hawking and Ellis, 1973, p. 198, Proposition 6.4.9):
Proposition 15. A relativistic spacetime is stably causal with respect to the open
topology if and only if it admits of a global time function.
38 Clearly, therefore, there is also a connection with reduction and emergence. For exam-
ple, suppose a similarity space consisting just of the models of two theories has symmetric
similarity relations. If one theory completely reduces the other while there being strongly
emergent properties in the latter (with respect to the former), then those emergent prop-
erties are unstable in the models in which they obtain. Further, sharper propositions along
these lines might be proven.
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A global time function is a continuous function of spacetime events that is strictly
increasing along each future-directed causal curve. There are many spacetimes
that support a global time function: the Minkowski and FLRW spacetimes are
just two well-known examples.39 Thus, with respect to a similarity structure that
induces the open topology—one which considers global features of spacetime to
be relevant—all spacetimes sufficiently similar to these are also causal, hence
they pass the necessary condition for inferring causality of a world or state of
affairs they model.
However, if one selects as the relevant similarity structure one whose induced
topology on spacetimes is the compact-open topology, the situation is totally
different (Fletcher, 2016, p. 376, Corollary 1):
Proposition 16. No relativistic spacetime is stably causal in the compact-open
topology.
Such a family of similarity relations determines spacetimes to be sufficiently sim-
ilar based on their similar empirical descriptions of compact regions of spacetime,
which are the best candidates for the regions we can actually measure. The above
proposition thus shows that, if the relevant way in which spacetimes must be
similar is to be based not on global similarity but similarity restricted to what is
measurable, then the principle of stability would prevent one from ever inferring
of the world that it is free from time travel. The situation is the opposite for
spacetimes allowing for time travel (Fletcher, 2016, p. 377, Proposition 5):
Proposition 17. Every relativistic spacetime which violates chronology does so
stably in the compact-open topology.
The necessary conditions for inferring the existence of time travel, as prescribed
by the principle of stability, are always met according to this way of determining
spacetime similarity.
Which of these is the “correct” result, if any? As I have argued here and
elsewhere (Fletcher, 2014, 2016), the choice of similarity structure on a collection
of models (and any topology it may induce thereon) should be based on contex-
tually dependent factors: all of and no more than whatever makes a difference
to the inquiry or question at hand should be included. While this methodologi-
cal contextualism may seem pragmatically agreeable, what is perhaps surprising
about it is that, through the principle of stability, it puts contextual constraints
39 Note that a spacetime admitting of a global time function in no way implies that
there is a preferred such function, which would define a concept of objective simultaneity
on that spacetime.
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on what inferences from models may be warranted or justified, without changing
anything about the models themselves.
6 Counterfactuals and Laws in Science
6.1 Ordering Semantics for Counterfactuals from Similarity
Structure
Scientists use models not just using classical logical deduction, to predict phe-
nomena or describe the world, but also to reason counterfactually about what
would have happened, what would be happening, and what would happen. As
philosophers (Lewis, 1981, 1973b, §2.3) and linguists (Kratzer, 1981) have given
semantics for counterfactual conditionals in terms of comparative similarity (or
possibility) as a sort of preordering relation on worlds,40 one might wonder
whether the present framework of similarity structure can be adapted to these
semantics, even though they have been interested in everyday language, while
we are here concerned with the models of a scientific theory. The answer, as I
show below, is affirmative: any similarity structure determines a certain partial
preorder, which is precisely the structure on worlds used in the ordering seman-
tics for the above analyses of counterfactuals. In what follows, I first describe
how the determination occurs, then draw out some implications of this analysis
for scientific reasoning and laws of nature in section 6.2.
Let (X,S) denote a similarity space.
Definition 20. For any x, y, z ∈ X, x is at least as similar to z as y is (with
respect to S), written x .z y, when for all ∼ ∈ S, if y ∼ z then x ∼ z.
This three-place relation determines the meaning of “greater comparative simi-
larity” through strictly more extensive satisfaction of the similarity relations in
S. In other words, the model x is at least as similar to the model z as the model
y when every qualitative manner in which y is similar to z is also one in which
x is similar to z.
The following proposition follows immediately from the definitions.
Proposition 18. For each z ∈ X, .z satisfies the following conditions:
40 Strictly speaking, originally Lewis (1973b) assumed a total preorder (satisfying certain
other properties), according to which each pair of worlds is comparable under the relation,
but seemingly came to relax that assumption later (Lewis, 1981).
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1. (Conditional Reflexivity) For any x ∈ X, if there is some y ∈ X such that
either x .z y or y .z x, then x .z x.
2. (Transitivity) For any w, x, y ∈ X, if w .z x and x .z y then w .z y.
3. (Conditional Weak Centering) If there are some x, y ∈ X such that x .z y,
then for all x ∈ X, z .z x.
The first two properties—conditional reflexivity and transitivity—make .z a
partial preorder.41 Conditional weak centering formalizes the idea that any
model is at least as similar to itself as any other, if there are any at all to which
it is similar. It is a consequence of the fact that similarity relations have been
defined as being right quasi-reflexive: if any element is similar (in some manner)
to another, then the latter is similar to itself. If S is neighborly, though, then
each .z is (unconditionally) weakly centered: x ∈ X, z .z x.
Such structures can provide interpretations of counterfactual conditionals.
Let A,C : X → {>,⊥} be (Boolean) property valuations of models of X—each
either holds or not at a given model. Models at which A holds—those x ∈ X
for which A(x) = >—are called A-models. If we symbolize the counterfactual
conditional as “if A were the case, then, C would be the case” as ‘A > C’, then
following Lewis (1981), we could write its truth conditions as follows in terms
of concepts derived from similarity structure:
‘A > C’ is true at a model z if and only if, for any A-model x ∈
⋃
α
Dα(z), there is
some A-model y such that y .z x and C holds at any A-model w such that w .z y.
In other words, ‘A > C’ is true at a model z just when C holds of all A-models
sufficiently similar to z. Now, it is not essential that one use precisely Lewis’s
1981 semantics for counterfactuals: any account whose truth conditions can be
logically constructed from the structure of a partial preorder on models can be
accommodated here.42 Indeed, my goal here is not to argue for a particular
semantics, but to show how any based on partial preorders can be modeled with
a family of similarity relations.
One difference with Lewis’s (and others’) accounts concerns the nature of
the objects related by the partial preorder. Traditionally, these have been possi-
ble worlds, which are thought to consist in or determine the truth values of all
propositions, perhaps requiring deep metaphysical commitments. By contrast,
41 By contrast, a total preorder . on a set A satisfies (unconditional) reflexivity: a . a
for all a ∈ A.
42 Swanson (2011) has criticized Lewis’s semantics and offered a replacement in terms
of cutsets definable from the partial preorder. I find his argument plausible, but do not
introduce his semantics only to minimize the introduction of new technical concepts.
Similarity Structure on Scientific Theories 43
the models of the present similarity structure-based approach merely represent
the descriptions of phenomena by some scientific theory or other. Unlike worlds,
these are generally intended just to represent phenomena in the domain of ap-
plicability of the theory, not to be complete descriptions of the universe. In this
sense, they are more like states of affairs than possible worlds, but unlike states
of affairs, which are typically understood as non-exhaustive collections of propo-
sitions or parts (possibly with abstractions) of worlds, models themselves need
not be directly a part of the world of phenomena but merely represent such a
part.
Accordingly, another difference is that one’s ontological commitment in us-
ing the semantics is to whatever one has committed to by using the models,
which covaries with the strength of one’s realist attitude towards the models.
This is entirely compatible with views from constructive empiricism through se-
lective realism to strong realism. In other words, it is not metaphysical claims
about the status of possible worlds (or states of affairs) but the commitments
to and practice with scientific models and theories that ground the semantics.
Connected with this, a third differences lies in the fact that counterfactuals
considered here can only be evaluated relative to some theory or model about
the phenomena they describe. In this sense, the present goal is a semantics for
scientific counterfactuals—e.g., “according to theory T , if A were the case, then
B would be the case”—rather than for natural language in toto. It is (in part)
this more restricted goal that give the present framework its power.
6.2 Similarity Structure and Laws of Nature
While similarity structure yields a familiar technical apparatus to give meaning
to counterfactuals, it also allows for novel treatments of two aspects of laws of
nature. First, note that the above semantics requires no reference at all to laws
of nature as such; they are strictly superfluous, for the models and similarity
relations on them suffice to provide counterfactual semantics. Thus, it suggests
a novel version of antirealism about such laws (van Fraassen, 1989; Giere, 1999)
that does not necessarily extend to counterfactuals—or at least a strong form of
deflationism that minimizes the special role of lawhood. Indeed, the usual main
complaint about antirealism about laws is that it has trouble grounding nomic
claims and inferences, especially the use of counterfactuals in science (Carroll,
2012, §5). However, in the account sketched above in section 6.1, all one needs
for this purpose are models and contextually determined similarity relations on
those models.
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While my account, as a formal semantics grounded in scientific models, is
compatible with antirealism about laws, it does not presuppose such antireal-
ism. For instance, it is also compatible with a systems account of laws, in which
the laws are best axiomatizations of true deductive systems for the world—
where “best” is understood as some balance of simplicity and deductive strength
(Lewis, 1973b, Ch. 3.3). Systems accounts can also use models and similarity
relations to determine the meaning of scientific counterfactuals while addition-
ally asserting that certain descriptions of those models are privileged as natural
laws.
There is a useful metaphor that illustrates this idea while also explaining,
under the antirealist interpretation, why seemingly substantive talk about laws
is so common in science. Imagine the models of a theory as the minuscule parts
of an intricately designed statue. Just as it is difficult for a sculptor to order a
block of marble of precisely the shape of her finished statue, or even communi-
cate what that shape is to a quarry, it is often difficult to describe the models
of theory directly. The sculptor begins by ordering a block of material of the
right sort which is expansive enough to contain the form of the statue, and her
application of skill to create the intended statue consists in successive blows that
remove material from the block. There is no unique sequence of chiselings that
the sculptor must enact in order to create the statue; any sequence which yields
the intended statue suffices, though some sequences are more elegant, repro-
ducible, and measured than others. Analogously, the theoretician interested in
describing or representing a theory with a class of models begins by selecting a
sufficiently common or well-understood class of mathematical structures—such
as vector spaces or probability spaces—that is also expansive enough to con-
tain the intended models. Her application of skill consists in the selection and
description of more or less easily describable restrictions on that structure to
produce the models of a theory. For instance, she might require a probabilistic
theory of belief over propositions of a first-order language to be regular, i.e.,
assign positive probability to any sentence which is not logically false. These re-
strictions might be said to be a system of natural laws, as they provide, within
the context of the theory, necessary connections, correlations, restrictions, and
determinations among phenomena. But like with the sculptor’s statue, what is
of ultimate substance for the theoretician is the finished product, the collec-
tion of models representing the theory, not the particular successive choices of
restrictions on the class of mathematical structures.
Now, just as the various sequences of chiselings a sculptor can make to yield
an intended statue can be clear or obscure, simple or complicated, the particular
“laws” the theoretician formulates can be so as well. Being clear and simple facil-
itates communication and eases the costs of applying a theory, e.g., for making
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scientifically informed counterfactual judgments. These are pragmatically virtu-
ous features, and explain why laws and features thereof feature importantly in
much scientific discourse. But this virtue does not necessarily accrue because
of any metaphysical significance to the choice of how to describe a collection
of models, just as the choice of chiselings away of excess material need not be
essential to the significance of the sculptor’s statue. Antirealists about natural
law may indeed deny such significance at all, while proponents of systems ac-
counts might endow this significance to particular descriptions meeting sufficient
standard of simplicity and strength. In either case, though, the pervasive cen-
trality of laws in much of science can be understood as arising from pragmatic
concerns. One can decide for oneself how metaphysically significant these cuts
and cleavages are.
The second novel feature of the present account is that it provides equally
well a semantics for counterlegals—conditional statements that suppose condi-
tions contrary to natural law—as it does for counterfactuals themselves. Because,
as just discussed, laws of nature play mostly a pragmatic role in the descriptions
of classes of models, the consideration of different theories embodying different
such laws requires no real emendation or extension. Models of different theories
may well be considered within the same space on which similarity structure is
placed, as was already done in the consideration of the account of intertheoretic
reduction in section 3. Thus the antecedent of a counterlegal conditional can
be evaluated in exactly the same way as a counterfactual conditional, as the
property designated by certain (non-actual) laws obtaining merely picks out a
collection of models in the space, just as that designated by certain (non-actual)
facts does so in the semantics for the conditional. The only restriction is that the
truth of these counterlegals, much like with counterfactuals, can only be eval-
uated relative to some more or less explicit joint collections of models. Hence,
the semantics is not for the counterlegals of everyday language, but for scientific
counterlegals: “according to the theories {Tα}, if laws L were the case, then C
would be the case”.
7 Envoi
As the previous sections detail, many central issues concerning scientific theories
can be treated with flexibility and precision using similarity structure and the
(pre)topological structure it induces on the models of those theories. In fact,
another general advantage of this approach and program is that nothing in
the analysis essentially depends on identifying particular classes of models with
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particular theories. As I mentioned in section 2.2, many philosophers of science
have argued that in some domains of science, models, rather than theories, are
the important unit of analysis (Bailer-Jones, 2002; Craver, 2002), and the present
approach is entirely compatible with this. The role of a theory here is only to
demarcate, name, or label a certain class of models, and it is largely immaterial
whether these are deemed to constitute or represent theories.
Furthermore, unlike the ambitions of some formal approaches to questions
in philosophy of science, the present approach cannot demonstrate anything of
much substance of a scientific theory or class of models without input from some
(real or imagined) scientific practice. This is because a theory or class of models
does not come equipped with a similarity structure intrinsically, but only gains
that structure through the specification of an investigative context. Whatever
matters in the application of a particular scientific theory or model bears on
how those models are relevantly similar. Requiring users of the formalism to pay
close attention to the details of what matters in a scientific context, rather than
abstracting those details away, is an advantage because it makes the formalism
applicable to real science in which context is crucial.
Another advantage is that the formalism does not presuppose any particular
position on the scientific realism/antirealism debate. Whether certain models
can be similar to one another in some respect does not depend on whether the
models are of the structure of reality, merely of phenomena, or some admixture
of the two. It does not even depend on this structure being of the same type for
all models, allowing for various forms of selective scientific realism. Now, as I
discussed in the section 6.2, it does suggest a more thin or nominal conception of
natural laws, but advocates of more metaphysically substantial conceptions of
laws are quite free to ignore this—nothing in the formalism demands it, although
more would need to be said about how universals or antireductionist accounts
of laws interface with it.
The approach does have a few disadvantages. In my treatment so far, the
models have been abstract, mathematical, or otherwise formal. Because simi-
larity relations are simply right quasi-reflexive binary relations, it is possible
in principle for them to hold between more informal abstract or even concrete
objects, but these tend to have vague or ambiguous properties to which the
successful application of the approach may be more difficult. Whether this is
possible requires further investigation which I have not yet pursued. Thus, the
need for formality may not be an intrinsic disadvantage, one that arises only
because of the approach’s present state of development. In any case, that the
approach is more powerful as the models are made more formally precise pro-
vides incentives for sharpening the descriptions and properties of the models in
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which one is interested and being more explicit about the theory (if any) one is
using, an independent virtue in itself.
Beyond these general advantages and possible limitations, work on each
of the topics treated above in terms of similarity structure can be extended
further. They also suggest many further open research questions varying across
its technical, philosophical, and historical aspects. The following subsections will
elaborate on some of these, suggesting just how much more there is to come.
7.1 Similarity and Topology
The framework of families of similarity relations presents both technical and con-
ceptual avenues for future research. Technically, sets equipped with similarity
structure are a (moderately distant) generalization of uniform spaces—really,
bases for semi-quasi-uniform spaces (Pu and Pu, 1974; Császár, 1974)—and
should admit of a more systematic development along similar lines. For exam-
ple, while I have indicated ways in which similarity structure on a set induces
(pre)topological structure on that set, more systematic functorial relations be-
tween these sorts of structures and others—uniform, metric, etc.—needs to be
explored. More development is also needed on the relationships between differ-
ent similarity structures and the ways in which requiring mappings between two
spaces to be continuous with respect to the structure on one of the spaces can
induce similarity structure on the other. Such a development would be needed to
show how, for instance, similarity on the value spaces of properties of a collection
of models induces similarity on the models themselves. And just as with topo-
logical spaces, one can also investigate separation, countability, compactness,
and connectedness properties, and invariance with respect to the isomorphisms
of the models.
Many of these technical questions have corresponding conceptual aspects.
For example, I have stressed that all and only the sorts of differences between
models that make a difference to the context of investigation, whether explana-
tory or otherwise, ought to be taken into account when constructing the simi-
larity structure for that context. Further detailed explication of this idea should
show how enough information about this context fixes the relevant similarity
structure, and how adding or removing potential differences that could make a
difference would add or remove similarity relations from the structure, respec-
tively. I suspect that the best way to do this is in terms of the properties of
the models, similarity between which induces similarity of models as suggested
above.
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Finally, it is an open question whether the whole framework will require
modification or adaption to the case of probabilistic theories and models. On
the one hand, the present framework does not make any explicit assumptions
about the models under consideration being non-probabilistic, so there is no
corresponding explicit reason to expect modification to be needed. On the other
hand, probability theory introduces new convergence and similarity concepts—
e.g., convergence almost surely, in probability, and in distribution—whose sub-
sumption under the present ones is not entirely clear.43 More work needs to
be done to assess the relationships between these concepts and those intro-
duced here before the present framework can be applied to many important
cases involving probabilistic scientific theories, such as statistical and quantum
mechanics.
7.2 Intertheoretic Reduction
There is a wide avenue for research pursuing applications of the definition of
reduction given in section 3.2 to specific cases of interest, which would involve
determining the most relevant similarity structures for the models of a pair of
theories of interest, the resulting character of the reductive relationship between
them—complete, merely partial, or neither—and their domains of successful
application. This last feature is important because it has implications for the
assessment of a putative reduction as an explanation. As described in section
3.3, Fletcher (2014) has already made progress on these questions for the case
of general relativity and Newtonian gravitation, but even there, the question of
whether the reduction is complete or merely partial is not yet answered. Further
concrete examples abound, including the relationships between the following:
theories of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics; quantum and classical
mechanics; field and particle theories, whether quantum or not, relativistic or
not, etc.; continuum mechanics, rigid body mechanics, and particle mechanics;
classical and molecular genetics; and theories of macro- and microeconomics.
Beyond wider applications, the similarity structure-based account of reduc-
tion also suggests avenues for research concerning two other venerable topics in
philosophy of science: theories of explanation, and conceptual continuity across
scientific theories. I have suggested in section 3 that reduction, as described in
the above section, can count as an explanatory relation of one collection of mod-
els by another relative to a context of features encoded in the similarity relations
43 See, e.g., Billingsley (1995) for more on the concepts and mathematics of probability
theory.
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on them. However plausible it may be, I have not offered a systematic theory
to undergird this claim. Now, perhaps a systematic theory of such explanations
is not needed, but whether this is so, it would still be illuminating to see how
the this type of approximative or similarity-based notion connects—or does not
connect—with other well-known accounts of explanation.
Regarding conceptual continuity, the exhibition of a reduction relation be-
tween the models representing two theories shows some continuity between the
theories, at least concerning the properties that make a difference for the sim-
ilarity relations. Conversely, the extent to which reduction fails reveals discon-
tinuity. By adjusting the similarity structure used to be larger or smaller, one
can test whether the addition or subtraction of specific properties to be tracked
by the similarity relations makes a difference for the reduction relation. This
suggests that there may be a maximal similarity structure that tracks exactly
those properties whose corresponding concepts are continuous in the theories—a
family that cannot include another similarity relation without entailing a down-
grading of the reduction (e.g., from complete to merely partial). Can a more
precise definition be given? Given such a definition, do such maximal structures
exist? If they do, what do they entail about the conceptual continuity between
particular theories of interest?44
7.3 Emergent Properties
Just as with the case of reduction, there is a wide avenue for research pursuing
applications of the different types of emergence defined in section 4.2 to specific
cases of interest, such as those arising from quantum entanglement or holistic
properties of complex composite systems. This would as well involve determining
the most relevant similarity structure on the models of a pair of theories of
interest and the character of the emergence that some properties of the one
have—weak, strong, non-reductive, or radical, and among these either partial or
complete. As proposition 13 suggests, it will be easy to find cases of emergent
properties of some sort or other, but I hypothesize that many cases will not
44 If this approach can be made more precise, it would also raise the question of to what
extent it is representation-dependent, i.e., dependent on the models that one uses to
represent a theory. If there is such dependence, then the approach would more properly
reveal information about continuity between (classes of) models, rather than theories
themselves.
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be interesting!45 What, though, makes cases of emergence like supporting a
concept of objective simultaneity (for Newtonian gravitation with respect to
general relativity) interesting, but not having a mass of 1 kg? I have suggested
that it is the emergent property’s implications beyond being merely novel that
make it so, but this suggestion certainly needs elaboration, if not emendation.
Perhaps the properties emergent in the models of one theory because they are
not even definable in the models of the other deserve special attention here.
Even more so than reduction, there are many different theories of emer-
gence that philosophers have articulated. I have described some of the rela-
tionships between the notion described here and those of robust novelty (But-
terfield, 2011a,b, 2014; Bouatta and Butterfield, 2012, 2015) and contextual
emergence (Primas, 1998; Bishop and Atmanspacher, 2006; Atmanspacher and
beim Graben, 2009), but the connections with others that are sensitive to the
scientific usage of the term (e.g., Gillett (2016) and Humphreys (2016b)) deserve
to be explored.
7.4 Modeling and Epistemology
The principle of stability, as formulated using the apparatus of similarity rela-
tions, raises many interesting questions about its historical status, its broader
role in science, what relationship it bears with analogous principles concerning
scientific modeling and epistemology, the epistemological status of the princi-
ple itself, and its connection with several traditional topics in epistemology. In
the first place, while I have located a version of the principle in the writing of
Duhem, but was Duhem the first to consider or formulate it? What, all things
considered, was Duhem’s considered view on the subject? Into which sciences
has the principle penetrated, and to what extent?
There are similarly named principles and concepts in the sciences, compar-
ison with which would also be useful. For example, in the theory of dynamical
systems, there is a concern with the (structural) stability of a system, its qual-
itative invariance under certain types of perturbations. Stability in this sense
seems just to be a particular example of stability in the sense described by the
principle, with the qualitative features in question being the ones tracked by
the relevant similarity relations. In that field there has been a stability dogma
45 Here I appeal to a version of what Humphreys (2016a) calls the rarity heuristic: a
satisfactory account of emergence can’t make it too common. More specifically, while on
the present account emergence will likely be common, interesting emergent properties
ought to be more uncommon.
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about the relevance and interpretation of stable and unstable features, which
has seemingly played a role similar to that of intended for the principle of sta-
bility (Schmidt, 2011). Further work is needed to assess the relations between
the concepts and history of stability in the principle and in dynamical systems
theory, and with other similar concepts used in science, such as robustness.
Further comparisons between the principle and similar principles in tra-
ditional epistemology are also needed. For instance, many philosophers have
proposed that a condition of safety be necessary for someone’s belief to count
as knowledge (Ichikawa and Steup, 2017, §5.3): in all nearby worlds in which
that person holds the belief, the belief is true. If one replaces “nearby worlds”
with “sufficiently similar models,” “belief” with “inference,” and “truth” with
“a property obtaining,” then this condition seems like the justified-knowledge
analog of the principle of stability, which applies to justified inference. As there
is much literature discussing versions of this principle, perhaps connections with
it could be forged to provide mutual insight.
Modal conditions on knowledge are also often discussed in the context of
the question of epistemic closure: whether, given one’s store of knowledge, one
is justified in adding to that store any claim it logically entails. It has been
suggested, for example, than an analysis of knowledge which takes safety as
a necessary condition for justification can yield a failure of epistemic closure
(Luper, 2016, §2.1). By comparison, I described in the section on modeling and
epistemology how, generically, the principle of stability entails that there will be
properties of models justifiably used for scientific inference that are not justified
in being inferred of their target—for Duhem (1954), for example, this included
the (in)stability of the solar system! This failure of transmission of justification,
which seems like a close analog of a failure of epistemic closure, deserves further
study and scrutiny.
Another worthy investigation concerns whether the principle of stability has
any connection with Fitch’s paradox of knowability, a logical result which seems
to state that if every truth is possibly knowable, then all truths are in fact
known (Brogaard and Salerno, 2013). Since the consequent is universally agreed
to be false, this entails that there must be some unknowable truth. The sorts
of properties of models to which the principle of stability prevents inference
could well be true of the state of affairs they represent, so that, if justification is
necessary for knowledge, a proposition expressing that such a property obtains
might be a concrete example of an unknowable truth.46
46 Such an instantiation may require some realist commitments to the theory being used,
but this too should be taken up in future investigation.
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Finally, the epistemological status of the principle deserves further investi-
gation: should the principle be generally accepted? Restrictedly? What are the
grounds for doing so? In fact, it is difficult to find instances in which an author
questions, furnishes an argument for, or provides a reference or citation for the
principle. One possible explanation for this is that the principle is constitutive
of a certain type of epistemic activity involving imprecision between model and
phenomena (or world), continuity between various models and various state of
phenomena, and the need for justification of inference from model to phenom-
ena. Would that these of these conditions constitute modeling activity provide
a contingent transcendental argument for this epistemic principle (cf. Chang
(2008))?
7.5 Counterfactuals and Laws in Science
As with previous concepts, more applications within various sciences of the ac-
count of counterfactual semantics need to be explored. This is of course also a
test of the particular semantical proposals for using the partial preorders gen-
erated by similarity structures. Attempting its wider application, e.g., in the
analysis of time symmetry, measurement, and non-locality in quantum theory,
may also show that these formal tools can be of use in analyzing problems involv-
ing modal concepts specific to the particular sciences. The approach considered
here is plausibly capable of this flexibility because the similarity structure one
selects for a class of models depends on contextually relevant features of those
models—they arise bottom-up from the context of investigation, rather than
being imposed from the top down.
A related direction of research also integral to understanding science is the
analysis of causation. Lewis (1973a) proposed such an analysis in terms of coun-
terfactuals, but his focus on the overall similarity of possible worlds too often
lets features irrelevant to a particular scientific context make a difference in the
truth value of counterfactuals (Menzies, 2014, §3). Meanwhile, the formalism
which has had the most scientific success, based on structural equations model-
ing, such as that of Pearl (2009) and elaborated by Woodward (2003), uses the
concept of primitive interventions which are given meaning through scientific
context. However, I conjecture that the oft-claimed irreducibility of these latter
formalisms to Lewis’s is based on the particular features of Lewis’s account of
similarity, not on the essential ideas of the similarity approach itself. Indeed, I
believe that a counterfactual foundation for interventions can be provided which
is also powerfully responsive to the questions posed within scientific theorizing
and modeling.
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Finally, the new, minimal view of laws of nature suggested by the approach
to counterfactuals also deserves further exploration and elaboration, both in
its affinities for antirealism about laws and for the systems approach. I have
suggested that it solves many of the problems associated with the antirealist
position, for example; to what extent is this the case? And to what extent does
it do so for the systems approaches? What is its relationship—e.g., compatibility
or incompatibility?—with other views of law of nature? These questions are
currently open; their answers are likely to provide and develop even more seeds
of fruitful future research.
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